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I.  INTRODUCTION
The  British  House  of  Lords  recently  considered  whether
Augusto Pinochet was subject to arrest and possible  extradition to
Spain  for  alleged  acts  of  torture  and  other  egregious  conduct
carried  out  during  his  reign  as  Chile's  head  of state.1  The  Law
Lords  held  that  a  large  majority  of the charges  against  Pinochet
were  not proper grounds  for extradition  under British law.  They
also  held, however,  that Pinochet  could  potentially  be extradited
for alleged  acts of torture  committed  after Britain's  1988  ratifica-
tion of the Convention Against Torture and  Other Cruel, Inhuman
or  Degrading  Treatment  or Punishment.2  In reaching  this  latter
conclusion,  a majority  of the Law Lords rejected Pinochet's  claim
that he was entitled to immunity from arrest on the torture charges
because  of his status as  a former head  of state.
The Pinochet decision implicates a number of difficult issues  at
the  heart  of modem international  law.  It  illustrates  the  growing
tension between the international law principle of sovereign equal-
ity  and  the quest  for  universal justice.  It raises  the  question  of
whether international  criminal law should be enforced  unilaterally
by national  courts  or through  multilateral  international  tribunals.
And it highlights the more fundamental issue of whether any inter-
national criminal process is appropriate  when  a nation, like  Chile,
has addressed the human rights abuses of a prior regime through a
domestic  political  compromise  that  facilitated  a  transition  to
democracy.
Although  these  international  law  issues  are  relevant  to  this
article,  they are not its focus.  The article focuses instead on  a re-
lated issue  also implicated in Pinochet: international law's increas-
ing interaction with  and influence  on  domestic law and  processes.
In particular,  we consider  what, if anything,  can  be learned  from
Pinochet  regarding  the relationship between  international law and
U.S. domestic law.  The specific  circumstances  of the Pinochet  case
- criminal extradition proceedings  against a former head  of state
1.  See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet,  [1999]  2 W.L.R. 827  (H.L.)
[hereinafter Second Law Lords' Decision]. Judicial appeals to the House of Lords are heard
by the Lords  of Appeal in Ordinary, or "Law  Lords."  Most appeals are heard by five  Law
Lords, but cases  considered  especially important are sometimes  heard by seven.  The Law
Lords  act as the final court of appeal for  all civil cases  in Great Britain and for all criminal
cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  See FIONA  COWNiE  & ANTHONY  BRADNEY,
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM  IN  CoNTExT 41-45  (1996);  GARY SLAPPER  &  DAVID  KELLY,  PRIN-
CIPLES  OF THE  ENGLISH  LEGAL SYSTEM  61-62 (1997).
2.  Convention  Against Torture  and  Other Cruel, Inhuman  or Degrading  Treatment  or
Punishment,  opened for signature  Feb.  4,  1985,  S.  TREATY Doc.  No.  100-20  (1988),  1465
U.N.T.S.  85 [hereinafter Torture  Convention].
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decades, however, U.S. courts have been grappling with issues simi-
lar to those presented in Pinochet in numerous  civil suits alleging
violations  of international  human  rights  law  by  foreign  officials.
The parties and judges in the Pinochet case extensively considered
this U.S. case law in analyzing whether Pinochet was entitled to im-
munity.  In this article, we in effect do the opposite:  we assess how
the  Pinochet decision  and its international  law  holdings  might be
relevant to U.S. civil litigation.
Plaintiffs  and commentators  are  likely  to  claim that the  Law
Lords'  analysis  in Pinochet - especially  their  reliance  on  inter-
national human rights law to limit Pinochet's immunity - supports
application of international human rights law by U.S. courts in civil
litigation.  The bulk of this article is devoted to showing why this is
not so.  Because of structural  differences between the criminal and
civil  contexts,  as well  as  differences  between  the British and U.S.
approaches  to the incorporation  of international  law, we conclude
that Pinochet  provides little support for civil human rights litigation
against foreign officials in U.S. courts.  We also argue that, because
of the vagueness of international human rights law and the adverse
foreign relations implications  of civil  suits  against foreign officials,
human rights litigation in U.S. courts should remain both limited in
scope  and under the control of the federal political branches.  Not
only is there nothing in the Pinochet  decision to the contrary, but in
several ways it bolsters our conclusions.
We begin in Part II by describing the background and proceed-
ings of the Pinochet case, the House  of Lords'  analysis, and the in-
ternational  law  uncertainties  highlighted  by  the  Law  Lords'
decision.  In Part III, we consider whether  developments  in inter-
national human  rights law should limit the  scope of the domestic
immunity  available to foreign  governments and  officials.  The Law
Lords  held  that  these  developments  did  limit  the  scope  of
Pinochet's immunity from criminal process in Great Britain.  In the
United  States,  however,  the  political  branches  and  the  federal
courts have, with narrow and specific exceptions, declined to permit
developments  in international human rights law to limit the scope
of foreign sovereign immunity from civil process.  We argue that the
adverse political consequences  that might flow from  otherwise un-
fettered private lawsuits  against  foreign  officials  for  human rights
abuses  justify  the broader  immunities  available  in  U.S.  domestic
courts.
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In Part IV, we consider the legitimacy of the U.S. counterpart to
the British rule, invoked by some of the Law Lords in Pinochet,  that
customary  international  law  (CIL) is part  of the British common
law.  In: the United States, plaintiffs and scholars have  argued for a
similar rule  of incorporation  to justify the domestic  application  of
substantive  international  human  rights law.  As we  explain,  how-
ever,  the constitutional  implications  of an  automatically  incorpo-
rated CIL are more problematic for the United States than they are
for Great Britain.  As a result, when faced with claims of interna-
tional immunity,  such as the claim of head-of-state  immunity  that
was at issue in Pinochet,  U.S. courts do not apply the CIL governing
this  immunity  directly.  Instead,  they  seek  and  follow  political-
branch direction.  The failure by courts to apply  CIL as automati-
cally incorporated common law in this context, involving traditional
rules of CIL that are a central component of international relations,
casts substantial doubt on the claim that international human rights
law should be applied as self-executing  federal common  law.
In Part V, we defend the United States' general resistance to the
domestic application  of international human rights law.  This resist-
ance has two  dimensions.  First, the United  States  does not  apply
international human rights law to domestic officials.  This approach
is justified  by the profound  uncertainty  regarding  the  source  and
content  of international  law and by the general  adequacy  of U.S.
domestic human rights protections.  Second, the United States per-
mits  the  domestic  application  of international  human  rights  law
against foreign governmental  officials only in very narrow contexts.
This limited embrace  of international human  rights law reflects  a
legitimate  concern  with  giving  private  citizens,  and  unelected
judges, too much influence  over U.S. foreign relations.  As we ex-
plain, both of these justifications for resistance to the domestic ap-
plication  of international  human  rights  law  - the  vagueness  of
international norms and the danger that private lawsuits will inter-
fere with foreign relations - find support in the House of Lords'
decision in Pinochet.
II.  THE PIvOcHET CASE
In this Part, we analyze the Pinochet  case.  We begin by explain-
ing the background  of the case and the complex proceedings lead-
ing up to the House  of Lords'  decision.  We then discuss  some of
the many legal uncertainties  highlighted  by the decision.
2132 [Vol.  97:2129
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Pinochet's Reign and Status.  In 1973, Pinochet,  then the com-
mander in chief of the army in Chile, led a military coup that over-
turned the elected  government  of President  Salvador Allende.  A
military junta subsequently appointed Pinochet president  of Chile,
and he ruled the country for the next seventeen years.  During his
rule, hundreds  of thousands  of people were  detained for political
reasons, and several thousand disappeared or were killed.  Pinochet
stepped  down  as  president  in  1990,  but he  remained head  of the
army until March 1998, when he was appointed "Senator for Life."
Pinochet's Arrest.  On  September  22,  1998,  at the  age  of  82,
Pinochet entered the United Kingdom for back surgery.  On Octo-
ber  16,  British  authorities  arrested  him  while  he was  recovering
from the surgery in a London hospital.  They based the arrest on a
provisional  warrant  issued  by  a British  magistrate,  which  was  in
turn based on an international arrest warrant issued by  a judge in
Spain.4  The  international  warrant  alleged  that  Pinochet  was  re-
sponsible for murdering Spanish citizens in Chile between 1973 and
1983  and that Spain intended to seek his extradition.  On  October
22, a British magistrate  issued  a second provisional warrant  based
on a new international warrant from the Spanish judge alleging that
Pinochet was  responsible  for  acts  of torture,  hostage  taking,  and
other  conduct  committed  primarily,  although  not  exclusively,
against Chilean citizens in Chile.  To understand the legal context of
these warrants  and the subsequent proceedings,  it is necessary to
consider  briefly the international  law concept  of "universal  juris-
diction,"  as  well  as  British  law  concerning  extradition  and
immunity.
Universal  Jurisdiction. International  law normally requires that
a nation that regulates conduct outside its territory have some con-
nection with the conduct or the person engaged in the conduct.  In-
ternational law also recognizes, however, the concept of "universal
jurisdiction," pursuant to which certain categories of conduct can be
regulated by any nation.5  The theory  is that those who engage  in
this conduct are hostis humani  generis, or "enemies of all mankind,"
3. Unless  otherwise  specified,  the  facts  in  this  section  are  drawn  from  the  various
opinions in the case.
4. For a description  of how the proceedings against Pinochet were initiated in Spain, see
Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6 Hum. Rrs. Br. 3 (1999).
5. See  generally  REsTATEmENT  (TmpD)  OF  T=E  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  OF  THE
UNrrED STATES  § 404 (1987); Kenneth C. Randall,  Universal  Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEXAS  L. REv. 785 (1988)  [hereinafter  Universal  Jurisdiction].
Pinochet 2133 June  1999]
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and that all nations therefore have an interest in punishing them.6
In  the nineteenth  century,  nations  invoked  this  concept to justify
regulation  of piracy  on the high  seas  and,  in some  instances,  the
slave trade.7  After World War II, national courts and international
war  tribunals  asserted  universal  jurisdiction  over war  crimes  and
crimes against humanity.8  Modem treaties appear to authorize uni-
versal jurisdiction  over  certain  additional  crimes, such  as  torture,
hostage taking, and hijacking.9
The universal jurisdiction concept was relevant to the Pinochet
case in several ways.  First, Spain invoked this concept as a basis for
regulating,  and  requesting  extradition for, Pinochet's  alleged  con-
duct.  The torture, hostage taking, and other acts allegedly commit-
ted by Pinochet took place primarily in Chile.  Moreover, most of
the victims were not Spanish citizens, and Pinochet was not himself
a  Spanish citizen.  Nevertheless,  the universal jurisdiction  concept
allowed Spain to claim authority under international law to regulate
Pinochet's  conduct.  Second, this concept played  an important role
in the House  of Lords'  application  of British extradition law.  His-
torically,  torture was  not  an  extraterritorial  crime  in  Britain.  In
1988,  however, Britain  enacted  a  criminal statute  authorizing uni-
versal jurisdiction over official acts of torture committed  anywhere
in the world.10  As explained below, the House of Lords ultimately
found that acts of torture committed by Pinochet before the enact-
ment of this statute were not a proper basis for extradition.  Finally,
some of the Law Lords invoked the  universal jurisdiction  concept
as  a justification for limiting Pinochet's head-of-state  immunity.
6.  See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal  Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm,  73 MINN.
L. REv. 349, 416-17  (1988)  [hereinafter Federal Questions]; see also Filartiga v.  Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876,  890 (2d Cir. 1980)  ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become  -
like  the  pirate  and  slave  trader  before  him  - hostis  humani  generis,  an  enemy  of  all
mankind.").
7.  See Jeffrey  M. Blum  &  Ralph  G.  Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction  over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien  Tort Claims Act after Filartiga  v. Pena-Irala,  22 HARV.
INTL. L.J. 53,  60-62  (1981).  But cf.  ALFRED  P.  RuBIN, ETmIcs  AND AtrIl-ORITY  IN INTRNA.
nONAL LAw  84-110 (1997)  (arguing  that the nineteenth century piracy and slave trade cases
all involved connections  to the regulating state).
8.  See Randall,  Universal  Jurisdiction,  supra note 5, at 805-10.  The universal jurisdiction
concept  was invoked by Israel, for  example,  as a basis for trying Adolf Eichmann  after it
abducted  him from Argentina.  See Cr.A. 333/61, Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann,  16 P.D.
2033, 2047, 2060-67, 36 I.L.R.  5, 287, 298-304  (S. Ct.  1962)  (Isr.).
9.  See Randall,  Universal  Jurisdiction,  supra note 5, at 816-19.
10.  See Criminal Justice Act, 1988,  ch. 33,  § 134, reprinted  in 12  HALSBURY'S  STATuTEs
OF ENGLAND  AND  WALES  1079  (4th ed. 1997).
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erned by its 1989 Extradition Act.'1  This Act provides that a per-
son who is in Great Britain and is accused  in a foreign state of an
"extradition crime" may be "arrested  and returned" to that state if
the state has  an extradition  treaty with  Great Britain.'2  The Act
defines an extradition crime  as either an offense committed within
the  territory  of  the  foreign  state  or  an  extraterritorial  offense
against the law of the foreign  state.' 3  For extraterritorial  offenses,
however, either the foreign  state must base its jurisdiction on the
nationality of the offender, or the crime charged must be such that
"in corresponding  circumstances  equivalent  conduct would consti-
tute  an  extra-territorial  offence  against  the  law  of  the  United
Kingdom."'1 4  In  extradition  parlance,  this  is  a  form  of  "double
criminality" requirement.' 5  The Act also makes clear that extradi-
tion  proceedings  cannot  be  carried  out  without  the  approval  of
Britain's Home  Secretary.' 6  The Act does  allow,  however, for an
initial arrest and preliminary proceedings  based, as in the Pinochet
case, on the issuance  of a "provisional warrant.' 17
Britain's  Immunity Law.  Great Britain has a statute regulating
foreign governmental immunity in its courts.' 8  This statute specifi-
cally includes heads  of state in its list of entities entitled to  sover-
eign  immunity .in  civil  litigation.' 9  Of  more  relevance  to  the
Pinochet case,  the statute  also  provides  that, "subject  to  ...  any
necessary modifications,"  heads of state shall be entitled to the im-
munities  accorded  to  diplomats.20  Britain's  diplomatic  immunity
statute, in turn, accords diplomats absolute criminal immunity while
11.  See Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 HALSBURY'S  STATUTES  OF ENGLAND
AND  WALES  558 (4th ed. 1993).
12.  Extradition Act  § 1(1).  The pertinent international  extradition agreement between
the United Kingdom and Spain is the European Convention  on Extradition, Dec. 13,  1957,
U.K.-Spain,  359 U.N.T.S. 273.
13.  See Extradition Act § 2(1).
14.  Extradition Act § 2(2).
15.  For an introduction to the concept of double criminality, see M. CuanEn  BAssIouN,
INTERNATIONAL  ExTRADmoN:  UNITED  STATES  LAW  AND  PRAcnca  388-93  (3d ed. 1996).
16.  See Extradition  Act  § 7(1).  The  Act refers generally  to  the  "Secretary  of State."
There  are a number of secretaries of state in Great Britain, each with different responsibili-
ties.  Responsibilities relating to extradition have been assigned to the Home Secretary.  See
ILAIPRE BARN=r,  CONSTrrT=ONAL  AND  ADMINISTRATrVE  LAW  786-87 (2d  ed. 1998).
17.  See Extradition Act § 8(1)(b).  A provisional warrant may be issued prior to the re-
ceipt of an authorization by the Home Secretary  to proceed with extradition.  See § 8(1)(b).
The Home Secretary has the power to cancel such a warrant, and he must do so if he decides
not to issue an authorization  to proceed.  See § 8(4).
18.  See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
19.  See State Immunity Act § 14(1)(a).
20.  See State Immunity Act § 20(1).
Pinochet 2135 June 1999]
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they are serving as part of a diplomatic mission.21  This form of im-
munity, known as immunity  "ratione  personae," is a status immunity
that attaches to diplomats - and, by reference, to heads of state -
as the personal embodiment of the foreign state during their time in
service.  After their service  ceases, diplomats  - and, by reference,
heads of state - are then entitled to criminal immunity for the acts
they performed  while  carrying  out their  official  functions.22  This
form of immunity, known as immunity "ratione  materiae," is a sub-
ject matter immunity that prevents the official acts of one state from
being called into question in the courts of another. 2 3
Divisional Court Decision.  Pinochet  challenged  his  arrest  in
court  and,  on  October  28,  a  three-judge  panel  of  the  Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice
held both provisional arrest warrants invalid.24  The court held that
the first warrant  failed  to  comply with  the double  criminality  re-
quirement because British law would not allow for jurisdiction over
the murder of a British citizen  committed abroad.  The court fur-
ther held that both warrants were invalid because, as a former head
of state, Pinochet was entitled to immunity from arrest.  The court
acknowledged  that Pinochet's  alleged  acts were criminal under in-
ternational  law but noted that  "[a]  former head  of state is clearly
entitled  to immunity in relation to criminal  acts performed  in the
course  of exercising public functions." ' 2  Britain's Crown Prosecu-
tion Service  appealed  the decision on behalf of Spain,  and several
human rights groups, including Amnesty  International, intervened
in the appeal.  In the meantime,  Spain issued  a formal  extradition
request that substantially expanded the number  and description  of
crimes  allegedly  committed  by  Pinochet,  adding,  among  other
things, a charge  of genocide.
First Law  Lords' Decision.  On November  25,  a  five-member
panel of the House of Lords overturned the Divisional Court's rul-
ing.26  As is customary, the decision took the form of seriatim opin-
ions.  The Law Lords held, by a 3-2 majority, that Pinochet was not
21.  See  Diplomatic  Privileges  Act,  1964,  ch.  81,  sched.  1,  art.  29,  reprinted in
10  HALSBURY'S  STATUTES  OF ENGLAND  AND  WALES 676, 682  (4th ed.  1995).
22.  See Diplomatic Privileges Act § 39.
23.  For a  general  discussion  of the  distinction between  immunity  ratione  personae and
immunity ratione  materiae, see IAN BROWNLIE,  PRINCIPLES  OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL  LAW
330-31  (4th ed. 1990).
24. See In re an Application  for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum re:  Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B.  Divl. Ct. 1998)  [hereinafter Divisional  Court Decision].
25. Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M.  at 83 (Lord Bingham).
26.  See Regina v. Bartle, Exparte  Pinochet, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) [hereinafter First
Law Lords' Decision].
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rant.  They  reasoned  that the immunity  of former  heads  of state
does not apply to acts of torture and hostage taking because  such
acts do not constitute official functions of a head of state under in-
ternational law.27  As one member of the majority explained,
international law has made plain that certain types of conduct, includ-
ing torture and hostage-taking,  are not acceptable conduct on the part
of anyone.  This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as
it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make  a mock-
ery of international  law.28
The dissenters argued, by contrast, that head-of-state immunity ap-
plies to illegal acts and has not been abrogated by relevant treaties
or custom.
29
In early December, Britain's Home Secretary authorized the ex-
tradition  proceedings  to  go  forward,  except  with  respect  to  the
charge  of  genocide.30  Shortly  thereafter,  Pinochet's  lawyers
petitioned the House of Lords to vacate the panel decision because
one member  of the majority had failed to disclose that he was an
unpaid  director  of  a  fund-raising  arm  of Amnesty  International.
On December  17,  the House  of Lords,  in an unprecedented  step,
granted the request  and vacated the decision.31
Second Law Lords' Decision. A  seven-member  panel  of the
House  of Lords reheard the appeal in January  and early February
1999.  The  government  of Chile  intervened  in these  proceedings
and  argued  for  Pinochet's  release.  During  the  proceedings,
Britain's  Crown  Prosecutor  submitted  a  schedule  stating  that
Spain's  allegations  against  Pinochet  - with  the exception  of the
genocide charge - would constitute thirty-two violations of British
criminal law.  On March 24, 1999, after seven weeks of deliberation,
the House of Lords issued its second decision.
The second decision differed  significantly from the first.  It did
not reach  the  head-of-state  immunity  issue  until after it had  first
dismissed, on the basis of double criminality, a large majority of the
extradition  charges  against Pinochet.  As noted above, the British
27.  See First Law Lords' Decision, [1998]  3 W.L.R. at 1499-1502  (Lord Nicholls),  1506
(Lord Steyn), 1508  (Lord Hoffman).
28.  [1998]  3 W.L.R.  at 1500  (Lord Nicholls).
29.  See [1998]  3 W.L.R. at 1476-78 (Lord Slynn),  1492-93 (Lord Lloyd).
30.  See 38 I.L.M. 489 (1999)  (statement of Jack Straw, Home Secretary).  The Home Sec-
retary  did not  authorize  extradition proceedings  on the  genocide charge  because  he con-
cluded that the double criminality requirement was not satisfied with respect to that charge.
See id.
31.  See In re Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.) (oral judgment delivered on December
17,  1998, written  reasons on January 15,  1999).
June  1999] Pinochet 2137
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extradition statute allows extradition for extraterritorial  offenses if
"in corresponding  circumstances  equivalent  conduct  would consti-
tute  an  extraterritorial  offense  against  the  law  of  the  United
Kingdom. '32  The Divisional Court had concluded with little analy-
sis that this requirement meant simply that the conduct  must be a
crime under British law at the time of the extradition request. 33  The
first House of Lords'  decision appeared  to reach the same conclu-
sion on this point, again with little analysis.34  In the second deci-
sion, by  contrast,  the Law Lords  considered  the issue  in detail.3 5
They held unanimously that the extradition statute requires the ex-
traterritorial conduct to have been a crime under British law at the
time the conduct took place. Most of the charges  against Pinochet,
including most of the charges regarding torture, concerned conduct
prior to September 29, 1988, the date when Great Britain made tor-
ture  an  extraterritorial  crime.  Six  of the  seven  Law  Lords  con-
cluded that these charges  therefore  could not serve  as  a basis  for
extradition.
36
After reaching this conclusion regarding double criminality, and
after dismissing the hostage-taking charge  on the merits,37 the Law
Lords  were left with charges  relating to torture  and  conspiracy to
commit torture after September 29, 1988, and with charges  of con-
spiracy in Spain to commit murder and torture in Spain.  It was with
respect to these charges that the Law Lords considered the issue of
immunity.  Six of the Law Lords agreed that Pinochet was generally
32.  Extradition  Act,  1989,  ch.  33,  § 2(2),  reprinted in  17  HALSBURY'S  STATUTES  OF
ENGLAND  AND  WALES  558, 561 (4th ed. 1993).
33.  See Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M. 68,79 (Q.B. Divl. Ct. 1998) (Lord Bingham)
("[T]he  conduct  alleged against  the subject  of the request need not in my judgment have
been  criminal  here at  the  time  the  alleged  crime  was  committed  abroad.").  The  Home
Secretary relied  on this holding  in his statement  authorizing extradition proceedings  to go
forward.
34.  See First  Law Lords' Decision, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1481  (Lord Lloyd) (noting that he
"agree[d]  with the  Divisional Court  that [the  argument  that the  conduct  must have  been
criminal in Great Britain  when it occurred]  is bad").
35.  Apparently,  Pinochet's lawyers  revived  this  argument  during the second  House  of
Lords' hearing in response to the Crown Prosecution Service's attempt to extend the charges
against Pinochet  to include  conduct allegedly committed before Pinochet  was head of state.
See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 833  (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
36.  Lord Millett dissented on this point, reasoning that extraterritorial torture was a com-
mon  law crime  in Britain  before  the  Convention  came  into  force,  and  thus  satisfied  the
double  criminality requirement.  See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at  912
(Lord Millett).  The Law Lords also  dismissed the non-torture charges on double  criminality
grounds;  the complex  reasons for  the dismissal  are  set forth in Lord  Hope's  opinion.  See
[1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 870-71  (Lord Hope).
37.  The Law Lords concluded that the charges against Pinochet relating to hostage taking
failed to state a claim under Britain's 1982 Hostage  Taking Act because there was no allega-
tion that the hostage taking was designed to compel action or inaction by third parties.  See
[1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 840 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),  850 (Lord Goff),  871  (Lord Hope).
2138 [Vol.  97:2129
HeinOnline -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2138 1998-1999entitled  to immunity  under  both  British  statutory  law  and  inter-
national law for criminal conduct committed while carrying out his
functions  as head of state.38  Six of the Law Lords also  concluded,
however, that this former-head-of-state immunity did not cover acts
of  torture  and  conspiracy  to  commit  torture  committed  after
December 8, 1988, the date Britain ratified the Torture Convention.
This is the most important holding in the case.  Lord Goff dissented
from this holding,  arguing that Pinochet  was entitled  to immunity
even  for  post-1988  acts  of  torture  because  neither  the  Torture
Convention nor CIL abrogated former-head-of-state  immunity.39
Three  features  of the  Law  Lords'  decision  have  special  rele-
vance to this article.  First, several of the Law Lords who embraced
the head-of-state immunity holding drew a distinction between im-
munity in a criminal proceeding and immunity in civil litigation. 40
They acknowledged  and appeared to agree with case authority, es-
pecially U.S. case authority, supporting immunity in civil litigation
for torture and other egregious acts.  Second, the Law Lords looked
to CIL to interpret the scope of British immunity law, in part be-
cause they concluded that British statutory law refers to CIL princi-
ples, but also  because of the long-standing British rule that CIL is
incorporated  as part  of the common law.  Finally, six  of the Law
Lords  expressed  the view  that the Home  Secretary  should recon-
sider his authorization  of the extradition proceedings in light of the
substantial reduction in the scope of the charges resulting from the
Law Lords'  decision.41
New  Authorization  to  Proceed.  On  April  14,  the  Home
Secretary  issued  a second  authorization  allowing  the  extradition
proceedings  against Pinochet to go forward.  The Home Secretary
concluded, among other things, that the House of Lords' reduction
of the extradition charges  against Pinochet did not warrant dismis-
sal of the case.42  He noted that he had wide discretion in deciding
whether to authorize extradition proceedings and that he had taken
38.  Lord  Phillips  dissented  on  this  point, reasoning  that  the  immunity  statute  gave
Pinochet  immunity only  for  acts committed  in Great Britain.  See  [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 927
(Lord Phillips).
39.  See [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 862 (Lord Goff).
40.  See  [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 889  (Lord Hutton), 913 (Lord Millett),  921 (Lord Phillips).
41.  Several of the Law Lords also noted that if the Home  Secretary did permit the pro-
ceedings to continue, the magistrate presiding over the extradition proceedings should care-
fully review the evidence concerning the remaining alleged crimes to ensure that these crimes
satisfied the double criminality  requirement.
42.  See 329 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Hansard) 311, 315 (1998)  (statement of Jack Straw, Home
Secretary).
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a range of factors into consideration.43  In addition to assessing the
legal  grounds  for  extradition,  the  Home  Secretary  considered  a
number of nonlegal factors, including "the possible effect of extra-
dition proceedings  on the  stability of Chile, and  its future democ-
racy; and  ...  the possible  effect of extradition proceedings  on the
UK national interest."44  As of this writing, Pinochet remains under
house arrest in England, and extradition proceedings are scheduled
to begin in late September, 1999.
B.  International  Law Uncertainties
In the Pinochet case,  three  different judicial  panels  examined
the immunity issue,  and each panel adopted  a  different approach.
Moreover,  although most of the Law Lords  in the latest decision
agreed that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for acts of tor-
ture committed after December  8,  1988, their reasoning in support
of this  conclusion  is unclear and often  contradictory.  In this  sec-
tion, we analyze the Law Lords' justifications  for denying Pinochet
immunity.  Our analysis is not intended as an argument against the
House of Lords'  ultimate holding.  Instead, our aim is to illustrate
how open-ended  and uncertain the law is in this area.
A majority  of the Law Lords  suggested that  a former head  of
state like Pinochet traditionally would have been entitled to immu-
nity for acts of torture under international law.45  Most of the Law
Lords also  agreed that  something happened  in or by 1988  to limit
this immunity.  No clear answer emerges from the Law Lords' opin-
ions, however,  as to how or why this limitation  came about.46
A  head  of state's  government  holds  the right to  the  head-of-
state immunity, and may therefore  waive  it. 47 One possible  basis
for the limitation of immunity, therefore, is that  Chile waived im-
munity in 1988  when it ratified the Torture  Convention.  Any such
waiver,  however,  must have  been  implicit,  since  the  Convention
43.  Id. at 315.
44.  Id at 316.
45. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),
855 (Lord Goff), 886 (Lord Hope),  903  (Lord Saville).
46.  Lord Phillips was the only Law Lord to deny the premise  that former heads of state
had a traditional immunity from criminal process under international law.  He reasoned that,
because national jurisdiction over universal crimes was a recent and rare phenomenon, there
was in fact no CIL  practice of granting former heads of state immunity from criminal process.
See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 918 (Lord Phillips).
47.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville),  906  (Lord Millett), 924 (Lord Phillips); see
also BROWNLM,  supra note 23, at 340.  For U.S. decisions to this effect, see, e.g., In Re Doe,
860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)  and In Re Grand  Jury Proceedings,  817 F.2d  1108,  1110 (4th
Cir. 1987).
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implicit  waivers  of immunity  are  disfavored  under  international
law.48  Perhaps  for  this  reason,  a number  of the Law  Lords  dis-
avowed a waiver theory.49  Also inconsistent with a waiver theory is
the Law Lords'  agreement  that the relevant  date in 1988 was  not
the date that Chile ratified the Convention, October 30, but rather
the  date that Britain ratified it, December  8.50
It appears,  therefore, that most of the Law Lords relied on the
theory that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated  rather than waived.
In other words, they concluded that something happened in or by
1988  that overrode  Pinochet's  immunity  as  a matter  of law.  For
some  - and perhaps  most - of the Law  Lords, the  abrogation
stemmed from the Torture  Convention.51  The  Convention's abro-
gation  of  former-head-of-state  immunity  would  not  likely  have
been  effective  with respect  to the  circumstances  of the  Pinochet
case until all three interested  countries - Spain, Chile, and Britain
- had ratified the Convention.  This would explain the Law Lords'
holding that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated as of December 8,
the  date  of Britain's  ratification,  because  Britain  was  the last  of
these three countries to ratify the treaty.
The  abrogation  theory  nevertheless  suffers  from a number  of
difficulties.  In a world of equal sovereign  states, it is unclear why
an abrogation of immunity can be accomplished  by a weaker show-
ing of consent than a waiver of immunity.  A possible answer is that
abrogation  of immunity  for torture  was,  as  of  1988,  a jus cogens
norm - a rule of international  law considered binding  on nations
48.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 882 (Lord Hope),  857 (Lord Goff),  904 (Lord Saville).
49.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 886 (Lord Hope), 900 (Lord Hutton); see also [1999] 2 W.L.R.
at 913 (Lord Millett) ("I do not regard [Chile] as having thereby waived its immunity.  In my
opinion  there was  no  immunity  to  be waived.").  But see [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 904  (Lord
Saville)  ("[Ilt  seems to me that the express and unequivocal  terms of the Torture Convention
fulfil any such  [waiver]  requirement.").
50.  One Law Lord thought that October 30 was the appropriate  date, but he was none-
theless "content to accept" the December 8 date.  See [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 887 (Lord Hope).
51.  We  say  "perhaps most"  because  the five  Law  Lords  who  believed  that Pinochet's
immunity  was abrogated  in 1988  invoked  the Torture  Convention  in very  different ways.
Lords Browne-Wilkinson and  Saville thought that the Torture  Convention per se abrogated
Pinochet's  immunity.  See  [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at  847  (Lord  Browne-Wilkinson),  904  (Lord
Saville).  Lords Hutton and Millett agreed that Pinochet's  immunity claim could not survive
the Torture  Convention, but they left open the possibility that it was abrogated prior to the
Convention because  of torture's status as a jus cogens crime. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 897-99
(Lord  Hutton),  912  (Lord  Millett).  Lord  Hope  believed  that  Chile's  ratification  of the
Convention  was the event that abrogated  Pinochet's  immunity.  He did not think that the
Convention by itself caused this  abrogation but thought instead that this was caused by the
development of a CIL of international criminal law, of which the Convention constituted the
final step.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 886-87  (Lord Hope).
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regardless of their consent.52  However, while it is true that several
of the  Law  Lords  described  the prohibition on  torture as  a  jus
cogens norm - and Chile apparently conceded  as much53 - none
of them described the abrogation of immunity as such  a norm.  In-
deed, several of the Law Lords who thought that Pinochet's immu-
nity had been  abrogated  denied  that the jus cogens status  of the
prohibition  on  torture  was  enough,  by  itself,  to  abrogate
immunity.54
Another problem with the abrogation theory, as with the waiver
theory, is the absence  of any reference to immunity in the Torture
Convention.  The plain language of the Convention makes torture a
crime without speaking to the issue of whether particular violators
can claim immunity from foreign court prosecution.  The immunity
issue  also  appears  nowhere  in the  treaty's  legislative  history,  or
"travaux preparatoires." 55  These  omissions seem especially  signifi-
cant in light of the fact that the drafters  of a number of other inter-
national  crimes  treaties  and  statutes  have  seen  fit  to  override
immunity in express terms.56
52.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,  art. 53, 1155  U.N.T.S.
332,344 (defining a jus cogens norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified  only by a subsequent  norm of general international  law having the  same
character").
53.  See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 841  (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),
898-99  (Lord Hutton), 912-13  (Lord Millett),  924 (Lord Phillips).
54.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
55.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 860 (Lord  Goff),  884 (Lord Hope).  The standard treatise  on
the  Convention,  which  was  coauthored  by  the  Convention's  Rapporteur (Burgers),  is  J.
HERMAN  BURGERS  & HANs DANELIUS,  THm  UNITED  NATIONS  CONVENTION  AGAINST  TOR-
TURE  (1988).  This book mentions immunity  only once.  In its commentary  on  the require-
ment in Article 5 of the Convention that a nation establish jurisdiction over a torture offense
committed within  its territory, the commentary  notes that
[u]nder international  or national  law, there may  be certain  limited  exceptions  to this
rule, e.g. in regard  to foreign diplomats, foreign troops, parliament  members or other
categories  benefiting from special immunities, and such immunities may be accepted in
so far as they apply to criminal acts in general  and are not unduly extensive.
Id. at 131.  As Lord Hope noted, this passage is "so cryptic as to defy close analysis," Second
Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 884 (Lord Hope), but it does appear to recognize
that CIL immunities may be consistent with the Convention, and it further suggests that the
framers  of the  Convention  did  not specifically  consider  the  issue  of former-head-of-state
immunity.
56.  See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,  art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548,  82 U.N.T.S.  279, 288 (contain-
ing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg)  ("The official  position
of defendants, whether  as  Heads  of State or responsible  officials  in  Government  Depart-
ments,  shall  not be  considered  as  freeing  them  from responsibility  or mitigating  punish-
ment.");  Convention  on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 4, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.  277, 280 ("Persons committing genocide ...  shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi-
viduals."); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Res-
olution 808, U.N.  SCOR, 48th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc.  S/25704  (1993),  reprinted  in 32 I.L.M.
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These reasons probably explain why most of the Law Lords who
relied on the Torture  Convention to abrogate Pinochet's immunity
rested  their conclusion  more  on the purposes of  the Convention
than on its language.5 7  Because the Convention applies only to offi-
cial conduct, they argued that it would have little or no effect unless
it abrogated official immunity.  One strand of this argument empha-
sized that a former head of state is the person most likely to have
been responsible for official acts of torture and thus should not be
able  to  avoid  the  proscriptions  of  the  Convention.5  Another
strand emphasized  that  official immunities  under  CIL extend not
only to heads of state, but also to other government officials carry-
ing out state functions.  As a result, the argument goes, if immunity
is not abrogated, "the whole  elaborate structure  of universal juris-
diction  over  torture  committed  by  officials, [would  be]  rendered
abortive.
'59
There are many potential objections to this purpose-based  argu-
ment for abrogation  of immunity.60  As Lord Goff s dissent noted,
the availability of former-head-of-state  immunity in foreign  courts
does not in fact negate the effect of the Convention.  Most instances
of torture by public officials will be committed in the state in which
1161, 1194  (1993)  (establishing the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and con-
taining that tribunal's statute); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 6, U.N.
Doe.  S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598,  1604  (1994)  (establishing the  interna-
tional tribunal for Rwanda and containing that tribunal's statute)  ("The  official position of
any accused person, whether  as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Govern-
ment official,  shall not relieve  such person of criminal  responsibility  nor mitigate  punish-
ment."); Rome Statute of the International  Criminal Court, art. 27(1), U.N. Doe. AICONF.
18319  (1998)  ("[O]fficial  capacity  as  a Head of State or  Government... shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground  for reduction of sentence.").
57.  See  Second Law  Lords' Decision, [1999]  2  W.L.R.  at  847-48  (Lord
Browne-Wilkinson),  914 (Lord Millett), 925 (Lord Phillips).  Only Lord Saville thought the
"express terms"  of the  Torture Convention abrogated former-head-of-state  immunity.  See
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 904 (Lord Savilie).  The "express terms" Saville had in mind are contained
in Article 1 of the Convention, which states that the Convention applies to torture "inflicted
by or at the instigation  of or with the  consent or acquiescence  of a public  official or other
person acting in an official capacity."  Torture Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, S.  TREATY
Doc. No. 100-20,  at 19  (1988),  1465 U.N.T.S. at 114.  Counsel for Chile  conceded that this
language encompasses heads of state but argued that the language did not abrogate immu-
nity.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 854 (Lord Goff).
58. See, e.g., [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) ("[I]f the former head of
state has immunity,  the  man most responsible  will escape liability  while  his inferiors  (the
chiefs of police, junior army officers)  who carried out his orders  will be liable.").
59.  [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
60.  According to Lord Goff, the argument was raised for the first time during the second
hearing before the House of Lords,  had previously "been  overlooked  by fourteen  counsel
(including three distinguished Professors of International Law) acting for the appellants  and
for Amnesty  International  and Human Rights  Watch,"  and "receives  no support  from the
literature on the subject[,] and..  . appears never to have been advanced  before."  [1999]  2
W.L.R. at 856 (Lord Goff).
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the  official resides, where  the Convention's prohibition  on torture
will apply without any international immunity defense.  In addition,
the  Convention's  criminal  prohibitions  could  also  be  applied  by
other nations in cases where the former-head-of-state's  government
is willing to waive immunity.  Another problem  with the purpose-
based  immunity  argument  stems  from  the  belief  of  several  Law
Lords that torture was  an international  crime  under  CIL prior to
the  Convention.61  These  same  Law  Lords  also  believed  that  a
former head of state retained immunity during this pre-Convention
period.62  Yet they failed  to  explain  why official  immunities  were
consistent  with  the  international  crime  of torture  established  by
custom  but not  consistent  with the  international  crime  of torture
established  by treaty.
Perhaps  the most  significant  problem  with  the  purpose-based
immunity abrogation theory derives from the Law Lords' insistence
that current heads  of state  enjoy  absolute  immunity  under  inter-
national law for acts of torture even after the Torture Convention.63
The  Convention  criminalizes  torture  committed by public officials
and others acting  in an  official capacity.  It no  more  distinguishes
between  current  and  former heads  of state  than it does  between
former heads of state and lower-level  officials.  The logic of the im-
munity  abrogation  theory  thus  would  seem  to  apply  across  the
board to all public officials,  or not at all.  If immunity for current
heads  of  state  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of  the
Convention, it is unclear why immunity for former heads of state is
inconsistent  with  those  purposes.  Some  of  the  Law  Lords  at-
tempted to address this problem by pointing out that current-head-
of-state immunity  attaches  to the  office,  whereas  former-head-of-
state immunity and lower-level  official immunity apply only to par-
ticular  conduct.64  This  is simply  to  argue,  however, that current-
head-of-state immunity is not abrogated by the Torture Convention
because, unlike former-head-of-state  immunity, it is absolute.  This
argument begs the question  of why current-head-of-state  immunity
61.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840-41 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),  886 (Lord Hope), 903  (Lord
Saville),  911-12 (Milett).
62.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 886-87 (Lord Hope), 903  (Lord
Saville),  912-14 (Lord Millett).
63.  See  [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 844-45  (Lord  Browne-Wilkinson),  898 (Lord  Hutton),  903
(Lord Saville), 912 (Lord Millett),  915-16 (Lord Phillips).  But see [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 852-53
(Lord Goft  (concluding  that the immunity would be absolute "except in regard to crimes in
particular situations before  international tribunals" (citing First  Law Lords' Decision, [1998]
3 W.L.R.  1456,  1474 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn))).
64.  See [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville),  905-07 (Lord Millett).
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former-head-of-state  immunity has been restricted.
In  any  event, this purpose-based  theory  of  abrogation  by  the
Torture Convention might not even have been the dispositive rea-
son for the Law Lords'  holding.  Many Law Lords reasoned, or at
least insinuated, that Pinochet's  immunity was abrogated  in or by
1988 not because  of the Convention per se, but rather because of
the status of torture  as an "international  crime"  under CIL.65  The
Law Lords were extraordinarily  casual in their identification of tor-
ture  as  an international  crime,  relying  in varying  degrees  on the
writings  of  scholars,  unadopted  International  Law  Commission
codes, and General Assembly resolutions that did not at the time of
their issuance  have the status of law.66  In addition, the Law Lords
were  imprecise  regarding  when  torture  became  an  international
crime, and why.  In these respects, the Pinochet  decision continues a
modern  trend  of  identifying  CIL  not  on the basis  of customary
practice, but rather on the basis  of verbal consensus  as reflected in
technically nonlegal sources  of law.67
More important than the casual identification  of torture  as  an
international  crime  was  the confusion  among  the Law  Lords  re-
garding  the  very  meaning  and  significance  of  the  term  "inter-
national crime."  Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that state torture
was  "an  international  crime  in  the  highest  sense"  prior  to  the
Torture Convention but that the prohibition on torture did not ab-
rogate immunity  until the time of the Convention because  it was
only at that point that torture was a "fully constituted international
crime. s 68  By contrast, Lord Hope thought that, even after the Con-
vention, the prohibition on torture did not abrogate  immunity un-
less  the  torture  was  "on  such  a  scale  as  to  amount  to  an
international  crime. '69  Lord Hutton took issue with this point, ar-
65.  Lord Hope expressly reasoned  that Pinochet's  immunity was abrogated  by torture's
status as an international  crime, see [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 882-83 (Lord  Hope); Lords Hutton
and Millett insinuated that this might be so, see [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 899 (Lord Hutton), 911-13
(Lord Milleu);  and torture's status  as an  international  crime  figured  prominently  (though
differently)  in the opinions of Lords Browne-wrlkinson and Phillips, see [1999] 2 W.L.R. at
840-42  (Lord Browne-wilkinson),  924-25  (Lord Phillips).
66.  See, e.g.,  [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 840-41 (Lord Browne-wilkinson),  853  (Lord Goff),  912
(Lord Millett).
67.  For descriptions and analysis  of this trend, compare Richard B. Lillich, The Growing
Importance of Customary  International  Human Rights Law, 25 GA. I. INTL. L. 1 (1996)  (argu-
ing in favor of trend), with Bruno  Simma & Philip  Alston,  The Sources of Human Rights
Law:  Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles,  12 AusTL. Y.B. INTL.  L. 82 (1992) (criti-
cizing trend).
68.  Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841,  847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
69.  [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 885  (Lord Hope).
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guing that, at least after the Convention, a single act of state torture
is an international  crime that abrogates  immunity.70  Lord Millett
agreed  that Pinochet's  alleged  torture constituted  an international
crime, but  he rejected  the notion that Pinochet  had a  preexisting
immunity from criminal process that needed abrogating.71 In addi-
tion to  these points, some of the  Law Lords  emphasized  that the
international criminal prohibition on torture was a jus cogens norm
or  was  subject  to  universal  jurisdiction.72  As  other  Law  Lords
pointed out, however, neither the jus cogens status  of a  crime nor
the availability of universal jurisdiction over a crime by itself elimi-
nates immunity.73
In sum, a majority  of the  Law Lords  concluded  that  interna-
tional law  did not provide  Pinochet with  immunity from  criminal
extradition process in Britain.  Their opinions, however, reveal sub-
stantial  disagreement  and  confusion  over  why this  was  so.  Even
though the Law Lords had the benefit of briefing  and argument by
Britain's  finest  attorneys  and  international  law  scholars,  the  Law
Lords  could  not agree  even  on which  aspect  of international  law
abrogated  Pinochet's  immunity  or  how  this  abrogation  was
accomplished.74
III.  PIOCHET  AND  THE INTERNATIONAL  LAW
OVERRIDE  STRATEGY
Most international human rights law, like international law gen-
erally, applies  only when there is a state action.75  As a result, im-
munities  from  suit  for  foreign  officials  guaranteed  by  both
international  law  and  domestic law  constitute  a  major  hurdle  to
human rights litigation in domestic courts.  We have just seen that
the Law Lords in Pinochet  interpreted  the Torture Convention and
70.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 901  (Lord Hutton).
71.  See [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at 912-13  (Lord Millett).
72.  See, e.g.,  [1999]  2 W.L.R. at 898 (Lord Hutton).
73.  See [1999] 2 W.L.R.  at 847-48  (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),  881  (Lord Hope).
74.  As we explain below in Part V, the vagueness of the sources and content of the inter-
national law at issue in Pinochet  is typical of international human rights law in general, and it
helps explain why the United States has been cautious in its incorporation of this law into its
domestic legal system.
75.  Except for a few categories  of conduct, such as genocide and war crimes, individuals
acting on their own cannot violate international human rights law.  This is true even for egre-
gious human  rights  abuses, such  as torture.  The Torture  Convention  covers conduct by "a
public official or other person acting  in an official capacity."  Torture Convention, supra note
2, art. 1(1)  (emphasis added).  Such private conduct presumably will violate relevant domes-
tic law, but it does not violate international  law.  See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243
(2d Cir. 1995);  Carmichael v. United Technologies  Corp., 835 F.2d  109,  114 (5th Cir. 1988);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran,  969 F. Supp. 362, 380  (E.D. La. 1997).
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CIL to  limit  Pinochet's  immunity  from  criminal  prosecution  not
only under international  law, but also under Britain's domestic im-
munity statute.  In effect, the Law Lords held that developments in
international  law abrogated  Pinochet's  immunity  on the domestic
plane.  Plaintiffs in human rights litigation in the United States can
be expected to invoke this aspect of the Pinochet decision as a basis
for overcoming immunity hurdles in U.S. courts.
The  Law Lords  considered  developments  in international  law
relevant to Pinochet's immunity in British courts because Britain's
State  Immunity  Act  limits  former-head-of-state  immunity  to  acts
performed in the exercise of official functions,76 and the Law Lords
interpreted this standard  as incorporating  developing international
law standards.  Ultimately,  therefore,  British  domestic  law  deter-
mined the relevance of international law to Pinochet's immunity on
the domestic plane.  As we explain  below, however, Great Britain
and the United States have different rules governing how the inter-
national laws at issue in the Pinochet case operate within their do-
mestic  legal  systems.  In  the United  States,  the  federal political
branches  have  not  authorized  the  incorporation  of  developing
norms  of international  law to narrow  the immunities  available  in
U.S. courts, and federal courts generally  have declined to embrace
an "international  law override"  of these  immunities  on their own
authority. 7 7  Not only does the Pinochet decision not provide  sup-
port for such an override in U.S. courts, in several ways it actually
suggests reasons for rejecting  one.
A.  Potential  Relevance of Pinochet  to U.S. Litigation
In this section, we explain why immunity issues analogous to the
ones  at issue  in Pinochet are  likely to  arise  in the United  States
primarily in the context of civil human rights litigation rather than
criminal extradition.  We also explain how the House of Lords'  con-
struction  of the  British  immunity  statute  might  appear  at  first
glance to be relevant to this civil litigation.
Criminal  Extradition. Courts in the United States  are unlikely
to  address  the  international  law  immunity  issues  presented  in
Pinochet  in the criminal extradition context.  To  see why, consider
76.  See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
77. There  is  nothing unusual in the fact that Great  Britain and the United  States have
different rules concerning whether  and how international  human rights law affects domestic
immunities for  foreign officials.  International  law does not specify how nations  must treat
international obligations as a matter of domestic law, and nations often differ as to whether
and how to incorporate international law into their domestic legal systems.  See Louis HEN-
KIN  ET  AL.,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  CAsES  Am  MATERIALS  153  (3d  ed. 1993).
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what would happen if Pinochet had come to New York rather than
London for his back operation and, while there, the United States
received  an extradition request from Spain.  Spain and the United
States  have  an extradition  treaty that provides for extradition  for
extraterritorial crimes.78  In addition, the United States has a crimi-
nal prohibition on extraterritorial torture similar to the one in Brit-
ain's  Criminal Justice Act  of  1988.79  For  these reasons,  Pinochet
would potentially  be subject to extradition from the United States
to Spain for acts of torture  committed in Chile.80
But would Pinochet as a former head of state be immune from
this  criminal extradition process?  Here there are large differences
between U.S. and British law.  As discussed above, the British im-
munity statute expressly provides current heads  of state with abso-
lute immunity from criminal process,  and it provides  former heads
of state with qualified immunity.81  By contrast, the primary basis of
immunity  for foreign  sovereigns  and their  officials  in  the  United
States - the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 82 - applies only in
civil cases. 83  Unlike  in Britain, there  is no statutory  basis in  the
United  States  for current- or former-head-of-state  immunity from
criminal process.  As we explain more fully below, the availability
of such immunity in the  United  States  is instead  a largely  discre-
tionary  decision by the executive branch.84  Courts faced  with offi-
cial immunity issues in a criminal extradition context do not look to
international  law;  rather, they follow  the  wishes  of the  executive
branch,  which in turn makes its decisions  without necessarily  fol-
lowing international law.85  Because of this difference between U.S.
and British immunity  law, the immunity holding  in Pinochet will
have little effect on U.S. criminal extradition practice unless and to
the extent that the executive  branch decides to follow it.
Civil Litigation. To say that the Pinochet  decision has little rele-
vance in the criminal extradition context in the United States is not
78.  See Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Spain, May 29,
1970, art. III(B), 22 U.S.T. 737, 740.
79.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340A (Supp. 1998).
80.  Unlike  the British Extradition  Act, the  United  States extradition  statute  does  not
purport to regulate either extraterritorial crimes or the principle of double criminality. See 18
U.S.C. §§  3184-95. Instead,  these issues are governed in U.S. courts in accordance  with the
particular  extradition treaty at issue.
81.  See supra notes 20-23  and accompanying  text.
82.  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 940583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified
as  amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611  (1994)).
83.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
84.  See infra Part IV.A-B.
85.  See e.g., United States v. Noriega,  117  F.3d 1206,  1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
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States have  for years been grappling with international  law issues
similar  to those presented  in Pinochet in civil suits alleging  viola-
tions of international human rights law by foreign officials.  Indeed,
the parties  and judges in the Pinochet case  drew heavily  on U.S.
civil litigation case law in assessing whether Pinochet was immune
from criminal process in England.8 6 Plaintiffs in U.S. human rights
litigation can be expected, in turn, to invoke the Pinochet decision
in support of their efforts to overcome the immunity of foreign offi-
cials.  To understand why Pinochet  is not likely to support these ef-
forts, it  is necessary  first to review the  statutory basis  for human
rights litigation and official immunity from civil suit in the United
States.
The  principal  statutory vehicle  for international  human rights
litigation in U.S. courts  has been the Alien Tort  Statute  (ATS).87
This statute, which  originally  was  enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, states that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction
to hear "any civil  action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or  a treaty  of the United States."88
Although the statute rarely was invoked  during the first 190 years
of its existence,89 it assumed new significance in the 1980 Filartiga  v.
Pena-Irala  decision.90  That decision held that the ATS  authorizes
federal court jurisdiction over suits between aliens for human rights
abuses  committed  abroad  and that such jurisdiction  is  consistent
with Article III of the Constitution.9 1
86.  See supra text accompanying note  40.
87.  28 U.S.C. § 1350.
88.  28 U.S.C. § 1350.  The original purposes of the ATS are uncertain.  For various per-
spectives, see Curtis A. Bradley &  Jack L. Goldsmith,  The Current  Illegitimacy of Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation,  66 FORDHAm  L. REv.  319, 357-63  (1997)  [hereinafter  The
Current  Illegitimacy]; Anne-Marie  Burley, The Alien  Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789:  A  Badge of Honor, 83  AM.  J.  hIrr.  L. 461,  475-80  (1989);  William  R. Casto,  The
Federal  Courts' Protective  Jurisdiction  over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Na-
tions, 18 CorN. L. REv. 467,499-510  (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical  Origins  of the
Alien  Tort Statute: A  Response to the "Originalists," 19 HAsrmos IrTL. &  Comp.  L. REv.
221,  225-37  (1996); John  M. Rogers,  The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate"
International  Law, 21 VAND.  J. TR.ANSNATL.  L. 47, 48-60  (1988); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A
Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HAsTrIGs INTL.  & COMP.  L. Rnv. 445, 446-
47 (1995).  For the best textual analysis of the ATS, see John C. Harrison, The Law of Nations
as Law  of the United States in  the Judiciary Act  of 1789  (unpublished  draft  on file  with
authors).
89.  In  1975, Judge Henry Friendly referred to the ATS as an "old but little used section"
and as a "kind of legal Lohengrin,"  and stated that "no one seems to know whence it came."
IIT v. Vencap,  Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,  1015  (2d Cir. 1975).
90.  630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
91.  See Filartiga,  630 F.2d at 885.  For a discussion of the Article III issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 189-91.
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The ATS does not purport to override the immunity  of foreign
governments  or officials.  As noted above, the principal source  of
immunity  from  civil  suit in the United  States  for foreign  govern-
ments  and  officials  is  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act
(FSIA).92  The FSIA provides  foreign states with presumptive  im-
munity from  civil suit unless  their conduct  falls  within one  of the
statutory  exceptions  to  immunity.93  In  Argentine  Republic  v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 94 the Supreme  Court  held that the
FSIA constitutes the exclusive  basis for the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign state, even with respect to cases that otherwise would
satisfy the terms of the ATS.95
The FSIA does not refer to suits  against individual  officials  of
foreign  governments.  Rather, it refers  to  suits  against  a  "foreign
state, '96 which is defined to include "a political subdivision of a for-
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. '97  The
FSIA's legislative history lists state corporations  and  agencies  but
not individuals as  examples of what is meant by the term "foreign
state."98  Numerous courts nonetheless have held that the FSIA ap-
plies  to  individual  officials  acting  in an  official  capacity.99  These
courts  have  reasoned  that  when  foreign  officials  act  within  the
scope of their official duties, their acts are the state's acts and must
accordingly  receive  sovereign  immunity.1 00  In  addition,  these
courts note that if individuals were not covered by the FSIA, plain-
92.  28 U.S.C. §§  1330,  1602-1611  (1994).
93.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
94.  488 U.S.  428 (1989).
95.  See 488 U.S.  at 438.
96.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
97.  28  U.S.C. § 1603(a).  Agency  or instrumentality  is  in turn defined  as, among  other
things, "any entity" that is "a separate legal person."  28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)  (emphasis added).
98.  See H.R.  REP. No.  94-1487,  at 15-16  (1976),  reprinted  in  1976  U.S.C.C.A.N.  6604,
6613-14.
99.  See, e.g., Junquist v. Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027  (D.C. Cir. 1997); Phaneuf v. Repub-
lic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1997);  El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d
668, 671  (D.C. Cir. 1996);  Chuidian v. Philippine Nat.  Bank, 912 F.2d  1095,  1103  (9th Cir.
1990); Trujillo  v. Banco Cent. Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d  1340,  1343-44  (S.D. Fla.  1998);
Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland  v. Commissione Del Fallimento/Interchange  Bank,  928 F.
Supp. 241,243 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189,1197 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Intercontinental  Dictionary  Series v. De  Gruyter,  822 F. Supp. 662,  674 (C.D.  Cal.
1993); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386,389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); American Bonded Warehouse
Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,  653 F. Supp. 861, 863  (N.D. Ill. 1987); Mueller v.
Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513,  1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  16970,  at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13,  1983);
Rios v. Marshall,  530 F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y.  1981).  But see Republic of Philippines v.
Marcos,  665 F. Supp. 793,  797 (N.D. Cal. 1987)  ("[Tlhe  sovereign immunity doctrine  ...  is
not applicable to individual government  officials.").
100.  See, e.g., Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-02.
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officials rather than the state itself. 101
The FSIA's immunities for foreign states and officials are in ob-
vious tension with the international human rights litigation found in
Filartiga  and other decisions to be authorized by the ATS.1 02 And it
is clear from Amerada Hess that the FSIA takes precedence  over
the  ATS.  To  circumvent  the  immunity  bar,  plaintiffs  in  human
rights cases  have  invoked  ambiguities  in the FSIA in an effort to
persuade courts to recognize exceptions to immunity. 03  In particu-
lar, they have argued in various ways that the FSIA should be read
to permit an exception to immunity for gross violations of interna-
tional human  rights law.1 04  Such  a  construction  of the FSIA  ap-
pears at first glance to be similar to the construction of the British
immunity statute adopted by the Law Lords in Pinochet. As a re-
sult,  plaintiffs  in  human  rights  cases  are  likely  to  invoke  the
Pinochet precedent in their efforts to override FSIA immunities.
B.  U.S. Rejection of the International  Law Override Strategy
As we explain in this section, U.S. courts have rejected attempts
to create an international human rights law exception to the FSIA.
These courts have relied on both particular features  of U.S. law as
well as broader constitutional principles.  Given this reasoning, U.S.
courts are unlikely to embrace  the logic of the Pinochet  decision.
No general international  law exception.  The FSIA contains  no
general  exception to immunity  for violations  of international  law.
As enacted  in 1976, the FSIA contained a single  specific exception
relating to a violation of international  law - an exception for cer-
tain takings  of property. 05  In Amerada Hess, the Supreme  Court
inferred  from  this exception  that other violations  of international
law do not constitute exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.1 0 6 In
a subsequent decision, the Court held that even torture - the con-
duct at issue in Pinochet  - can be sovereign conduct subject to the
presumptive immunity  of the FSIA. 07
101.  See, e.g.,  Chuidian,  912 F.2d at 1102.
102.  See generally David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign
Immunities in  U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. IM.  L. 255 (1995/1996).
103.  See infra text accompanying notes 105-29.
104.  See infra text accompanying  notes 108-14.
105.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)  (1994).
106.  See Argentine  Republic  v. Amerada  Hess Shipping  Corp.,  488 U.S.  428,  435-36
(1989).
107.  See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993)  (reasoning that "however mon-
strous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has
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No jus cogens waiver exception. Faced with a rejection of a gen-
eral  international  law exception  to immunity, plaintiffs  and  some
commentators have proposed an exception for fundamental,  or "jus
cogens,"  norms  of international  human  rights  law.'08  As  noted
above, a jus cogens norm is "accepted and recognized  by the inter-
national community  of States as  a whole as  a norm from which no
derogation  is permitted."' 09  Although the FSIA  contains no gen-
eral  exception  to immunity  for violations  of international  human
rights law, it does contain  an exception to immunity  for situations
where the foreign state "has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication.' 10  Plaintiffs  and commentators  have invoked this
exception to argue that foreign governments waive  their immunity
by implication when they violate jus cogens norms of international
human rights law, such as the prohibitions on genocide, war crimes,
and  torture.
The three federal appeals courts that have considered this argu-
ment  (or  a variation  of it) have rejected  it."'  These  courts  have
emphasized that the governing law is the domestic FSIA, not inter-
national law, and that the FSIA contains no jus cogens exception."12
The most recent of these  decisions noted that  Congress  amended
the FSIA after the earlier decisions but failed to enact any general
jus cogens exception  to  the FSIA, thereby suggesting  that  "Con-
gress is not necessarily  averse  to permitting some violations  of jus
cogens to be redressed  through  channels  other  than  suits  against
long  been  understood  for  purposes  of the  restrictive  theory  as  peculiarly  sovereign  in
nature").
108.  For commentary to this effect,  see, for example, Adam  C. Belsky  et al., Comment,
Implied Waiver  Under the FSIA:  A  Proposed Exception to  Immunity for  Violations of
Peremptory Norms of International  Law, 77 CAL.  L. REv. 365 (1989),  Thora A. Johnson, A
Violation of Jus  Cogens Norms as  an Implicit  Waiver of Immunity  Under the  Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 MD. J. INn. L. & TRADE  259 (1995).  For examples of similar
plaintiffs'  claims, see infra note 111.
109.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 52, art. 53,  1155 U.N.T.S. at
334.
110.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
111.  See Smith  v. Socialist People's  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,  101 F.3d 239,  245 (2d  Cir.
1996); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sampsom v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Denegri v. Republic
of Chile, No. 86-3085,  1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  4233, at *11-12  (D.D.C. April 3,  1992).  See
generally Garland A. Kelly,  Note, Does Customary International  Law Supersede a Federal
Statute?, 37 COLUM. J.  TRANSNATL.  L. 507  (1999)  (describing and defending these decisions).
112.  By contrast, one dissenting judge has  argued  that the  FSIA should be interpreted
not to give  more  immunity in this  context than  is  conferred  under  international  law.  See
Princz,  26 F.3d at 1176  (WaId, J., dissenting).  That judge reasoned that "the clear import of
international law is to disavow a foreign sovereign's claims to immunity where that sovereign
is accused of violating universally accepted norms of conduct essential to the preservation  of
the international  order."  26 F.3d at 1183.
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"Congress  might well have expected the response to [allegations  of
terrorism]  to come from the political branches of the Government,
which are not powerless to penalize a foreign state for international
terrorism.11 4  In short, courts have recognized that there are means
of redress for  human  rights  abuses  other than  civil  suits  in  U.S.
courts,  and  they  have  insisted  that  even  the  most  fundamental
norms of international human rights law do not override domestic
immunities until Congress  says so.
No  international treaty exception.  Plaintiffs  and  scholars  also
have  attempted to  override domestic  immunities  for international
human rights law violations by relying on the FSIA's treaty excep-
tion.  The FSIA's presumptive immunity is "[s]ubject  to existing in-
ternational agreements to which the United States  [was]  a party at
the time  of  [the  FSIA's]  enactment."' 5  The  Supreme  Court  in
Amerada Hess interpreted this provision to apply only "when inter-
national agreements  'expressly  conflic[t]'  with the immunity provi-
sions  of  the  FSIA. 11 6  The  Court  further  noted  that  a  foreign
nation does not "waive its immunity ...  by signing an international
agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit
in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action
in  the  United  States." 117  A  number  of  lower  courts  have  con-
cluded,  following Amerada Hess, that  a nation's  ratification  of a
human rights treaty does not constitute a waiver of the nation's im-
munity from U.S. judicial process  unless the treaty itself contains a
waiver or confers a private  cause of action." 8
No human rights exception to head-of-state immunity. As we ex-
plain in some detail in the next Part, both before and after the en-
actment  of the FSIA courts  have looked  to the political  branches
for authorization  to apply head-of-state immunity." 9  Because the
FSIA does not by its terms refer to heads of state, most courts have
sought this authorization from the executive  branch in the form of
113.  Smith, 101 F.3d at 244.
114.  Smith, 101 F.3d at 244.
115.  28 U.S.C.  § 1604.
116.  Argentine  Republic  v.  Amerada  Hess  Shipping  Corp.,  488  U.S.  428,  442  (1989)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17  (1976), reprinted in 1976  U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615-16
and  S.  REP. No. 94-1310, at 17  (1976)).
117.  Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442-43.
118.  See Princz v. Federal  Republic  of Germany,  26 F.3d  1166, 1175  (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,719-20  (9th Cir. 1992); Saltany v.
Reagan, 886 F.2d 438,441  (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F.
Supp.  1108,  1119 (N.D.  IM.  1997).
119.  See infra Part IV.A-B.
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an  executive  suggestion.120  In  so  doing,  courts  have  recognized
head-of-state immunity even in the face of alleged violations of in-
ternational  criminal and human rights law.12'  The basis and scope
of former-head-of-state  immunity are less certain, 22 but nothing in
the case law suggests  a human rights exception to this immunity.123
The  discretionary function  anomaly.  Plaintiffs  also  have  at-
tempted  to  create  an  international  law  override  to  the  FSIA
through its  "non-commercial  tort" exception,  which  denies immu-
nity for torts that  cause injury or damage  in the United  States.124
This exception in turn contains its own exception that preserves im-
munity for claims "based upon the exercise or performance  or the
failure  to exercise or perform a  discretionary  function."'125  Courts
are divided over whether illegal acts can be discretionary  for these
purposes.126  Most important for now, however, is the district court
decision, Letelier v. Republic of Chile,'27 suggesting in this context
120. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87.
121.  See, e.g., Lafontant v. Axistide, 844 F. Supp.  128,  137-39 (E.D.N.Y.  1994)  (granting
immunity to President Aristide of Haiti in a suit alleging violations  of international human
rights  law); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988)  (granting immunity to
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a suit alleging violations of international law relating to
her assistance with air strikes in Libya); Kilroy v. Windsor, No. C 78-291  (N.D. Ohio  1978),
excerpted in State Representation,  1978  DIGES-r  § 3,  at 641-43  (granting  immunity  to  the
Prince  of Wales  in  a suit alleging  that he  was  responsible  for  human rights  violations  in
Northern  Ireland); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic  of Iran,  999 F. Supp. 1, 24  (D.D.C.
1998) (assuming  that head-of-state immunity ordinarily would apply to "state sponsorship of
terrorism"  because  such  conduct  involves  a  "decision  made  at  the  highest  levels  of
government").
122. See generally Peter Evan Bass, Note, Ex-Head of State Immunity:  A Proposed  Statu-
tory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97  YALE  L.J.  299  (1987).
123.  Most  former-head-of-state  immunity  claims  have  been resolved  on  the  basis  of
waiver.  See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
817 F.2d 1108, 1110-11  (4th Cir. 1987); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 211  (S.D. Fla.  1993).
Some courts have suggested  in dicta that former-head-of-state  immunity does not extend to
private  (as opposed  to official) acts.  See, e.g., In re Doe,  860 F.2d at 44 (dicta); Republic of
the Philippines v. Marcos,  806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986)  (dicta); United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n.l (S.D. Fla. 1990)  (dicta); cf Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207, 1986
U.S.  Dist. LEXIS  22541,  at *17  (D.  Haw. July  18,  1986)  (noting, in response  to claim  of
former-head-of-state  immunity,  that "[u]ntil  such  time as head of state immunity is made  a
creature of judicial interpretation, this court will not intrude on the prerogative of the execu-
tive branch  to  make such  determinations");  Roxas  v. Marcos,  969 P.2d  1209,  1252 (Haw.
1998) (questioning, perhaps  in dicta, the availability of immunity to former heads of state).
124.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)  (1994).
125.  § 1605(a)(5)(A).  See  generally  Sienho  Yee,  Note,  The  Discretionary Function
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:  When in America, Do the Romans
Do as the Romans Wish?, 93  COLUM.  L. REv. 744 (1993).
126.  Courts holding that an illegal act can be discretionary include Risk v. Halvorsen,  936
F.2d 393,  397  (9th Cir. 1991); MacArthur Area Citizens Assn. v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d
918,  922 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 392  (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  By
contrast, in Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), the court held that
foreign officials did not have discretion to commit a clear violation of their own domestic law.
127.  488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
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that there is no discretion  to commit  a  clear violation  of interna-
tional law.128 The court concluded that Chile's alleged involvement
in the assassination of former Chilean officials in the United States
was  not  discretionary  because  it  was  "clearly  contrary  to  the
precepts of humanity  as recognized  in both national  and interna-
tional law.' 29
Letelier is the only decision of which  we  are  aware suggesting
that international law might abrogate immunity within the U.S. do-
mestic legal  system.  Even if the Letelier decision  correctly inter-
preted  the  scope  of  the  discretionary  function  exception,  the
decision has limited significance  to human rights litigation because
such litigation almost always involves human rights abuses commit-
ted on foreign soil, while the noncommercial tort exception applies
only in situations where the injury or damage occurs in the United
States.  In  any event,  the Letelier analysis is  difficult  to reconcile
with the Supreme Court's later decision in Amerada Hess. The in-
sistence  of Amerada Hess and its progeny  that  the  only interna-
tional  law-related  exceptions  to  immunity  under  the  FSIA  must
appear on the face of the statute likely sounded the death knell for
Letelier's discretionary  function  analysis.
Individual  Capacity Suits. Although the FSIA is generally appli-
cable in human rights suits brought against foreign government offi-
cials,130 some courts have concluded that certain human rights suits
against individuals  do not implicate the FSIA.131  These  courts in-
terpret the FSIA to extend immunity only to individuals acting  in
an official capacity, and the courts look to foreign law to determine
whether the individuals accused of human rights abuses were so act-
ing.  If the alleged human  rights  abuses  are not authorized  under
the foreign  official's  domestic law, these  courts  conclude  that the
abuses are beyond the official's scope of authority and thus outside
128.  Coincidentally for purposes of this article, that case also involved alleged conduct by
Pinochet's government.
129. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673; see also Alicog  v. Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia,  860 F.
Supp. 379,  383  (S.D. Tex. 1994)  (stating in dicta that "[k]idnapping,  private imprisonment,
and  assassination are all  beyond the scope  of legitimate  diplomatic  operations  and are not
protected by the discretionary function exception, and courts have jurisdiction over a govern-
ment committing those acts").
130. See supra note 99 and accompanying  text.
131.  See Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467,  1470  (9th Cir. 1994); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah,
921 F. Supp.  1189,  1198 (S.D.N.Y.  1996); Xuncax  v. Gramajo,  886 F. Supp. 162,  174-76 (D.
Mass.  1995).  This case  law is  not uniform;  a number  of courts  have  applied  the FSIA  to
individual officials who allegedly engaged in abusive and illegal conduct.  See, e.g., Herbage v.
Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleged improper arrest and extradition); Kline v.
Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)  (alleged expulsion from country without due
process).
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of the official immunities  conferred  by the FSIA.  The absence  of
immunity in these cases does not turn on the foreign official's viola-
tion of international law.  These cases thus do not represent  an in-
ternational law override of the FSIA. 32
Congressional responses.  Human  rights  activists  often  have
complained  to Congress regarding the limitations  on human rights
litigation, including the restrictions imposed by domestic immunity
law.  Congress's responses  to these  complaints  have  been  limited
and targeted, further confirming that immunity should be available
even for human rights abuses unless and until Congress  creates  an
exception.  For example, in response to concerns that international
human  rights  law  might not provide  a  private  right  of action,133
Congress  enacted  the Torture  Victim  Protection  Act  (TVPA).1
3 4
This  1992 statute  created  a federal  cause of action  against foreign
officials who under  color of state law commit torture  or extrajudi-
cial killings.  Nothing on the face of the TVPA overrides the immu-
nities of the FSIA, and the TVPA's legislative  history makes clear
that the TVPA is "subject to restrictions in the [FSIA]."' 35  The leg-
132. Traditionally,  the act of state doctrine might have precluded courts in individual ca-
pacity cases from inquiring into the validity of foreign acts under foreign law.  See Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)  ("[C]ourts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.").  In Banco Nacional  de
Cuba v.  Sabbatino, 376 U.S.  398 (1964),  however,  the Supreme  Court held  that the act  of
state doctrine is based on domestic separation of powers considerations rather than (as previ-
ously been the case) international law.  See 376 U.S. at 421-23.  The Court expressed particu-
lar concern  that judicial inquiry into the validity of foreign  government acts might interfere
with the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations.  See 376 U.S. at 431-33.  One conse-
quence of this new conception of the act of state doctrine is that the doctrine is limited to the
official, public acts of a foreign government.  Only an adjudication  of those acts, courts have
reasoned, is likely to embarrass the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations.  See
Lynn E. Parseghian, Defining the "Public  Act" Requirement in the Act of State Doctrine,  58 U.
Cm. L. Rpv. 1151 (1991)  (collecting  cases).  Invoking this limitation, some courts have con-
cluded that the adjudication of alleged human  rights abuses not authorized by a foreign gov-
emnment are not "public acts" and thus are not covered by the act of state doctrine.  See, e.g.,
Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1471 (describing earlier decision); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419,
1431-34  (9th Cir. 1989); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,  672 F. Supp.  1531, 1546  (N.D. Cal.  1987).
133.  These  concerns  were  fueled  by  Judge  Bork's  concurring  opinion  in  Tel-Oren  v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), in which he argued that CIL does not
ordinarily confer a private right of action.  See 726 F.2d at 816-19.  For three recent decisions
refusing to imply a private right of action under international human rights law, see Heinrich
v.  Sweet,  1999  U.S.  Dist. LEXIS  6669  (D.  Mass.  Apr. 30,  1999),  Hawkins v.  Comparat-
Cassani,  33 F. Supp. 2d 1244  (C.D. Cal. 1999)  and White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp.  1380 (E.D.
Wash.  1998).  These  courts  noted  the  adequacy  of domestic  legal  protections,  the limited
nature  of Congress's  codification  of international  human rights  law in the Torture  Victim
Protection Act, see infra note 134, and the fact that the domestic enforcement  of interna-
tional human rights law is primarily the responsibility of Congress and the Executive rather
than  the courts.
134.  Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73  (1992)  (set forth in statutory note following Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350  (1994)).
135.  H.R.  REP. No. 102-367,  at 5  (1991),  reprinted in 1992  U.S.C.C.A.N.  84,  88.  The
Senate  Report  similarly  states  that  the  TVPA  "is  not  meant  to  override  the  Foreign
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the doctrines  of diplomatic  and head of state immunity."' 1 36  Simi-
larly, other human rights and terrorism-related statutes, such as the
Genocide  Convention  Implementation  Act 37  and the Act for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime  of Hostage-Taking, 38 do
not purport to override immunities from suit.
There have been many calls in recent years for Congress to cre-
ate exceptions  to FSIA immunity for human rights  abuses,  and a
number of bills to this effect have been introduced in Congress. 139
These  efforts resulted in the enactment in 1996  of a  very narrow
human rights exception to immunity.  This new exception removes
immunity for torture, extrajudicial killing, and certain terrorist acts,
but only when committed by nations that have been deemed spon-
sors of terrorism, and only in cases where the victim or claimant is a
U.S.  national. 40  Only  seven  nations - Cuba,  Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria - are currently deemed sponsors of
terrorism.141  Even in these limited circumstances,  plaintiffs invok-
ing the new exception  face  an  exhaustion requirement,  discovery
restrictions, and a statute of limitations.142  Against the background
of Amerada Hess, this narrow  and precise exception  to immunity
suggests  that, in cases not covered  by the exception, immunity re-
mains available even with respect to egregious human rights abuses.
Sovereign Immunities Act....  ."  S.  RmP. No. 102-249,  at 7 (1991).  The Senate Report also
states, however,  that "[t]he legislation  uses  the term 'individual'  to make  crystal clear that
foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances:  only
individuals may be sued."  S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7.  Because the courts had held long before
the TVPA that government officials acting in their official capacities come within the FSIA's
immunities, see supra text accompanying note 99, and since the legislative history makes clear
that the TVPA was not meant to override the FSIA, the reference to "individuals"  presuma-
bly means foreign  officials acting in excess of their official  capacities, for in this context the
FSIA has been interpreted not to confer immunity, see supra notes 130-32 and accompanying
text.
136.  H.R. RaP. No. 102-367, at 5; see also S. REp. No. 102-249, at 7-8  ("The TVPA is not
intended  to override  traditional diplomatic immunities  ....  Nor should  visiting heads of
state be subject to suit under the TVPA.").
137.  18 U.S.C.  §  1091 (1988).
138.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186  (1984).
139.  See Jeffrey  Jacobson,  Note,  Trying To Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole:  The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 WHrrrmR L. REv. 757,
773-75 (1998)  (recounting these efforts).
140.  See Antiterrorism and Effective  Death Penalty Act of 1996,  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(Supp. III  1997).
141.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).  These nations are presently deemed to be state sponsors
of terrorism under 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050)  (1994) and 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994).  See 22 C.F.R.
§ 126.1(d)  (1998).
142. See 28 U.S.C. §  1605(a)(7)(B)(i),  (f),  (g).
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In sum, U.S. courts generally have rejected efforts to circumvent
the availability of domestic immunity for foreign  officials by refer-
ence to international human rights law.  Instead, they have treated
questions of immunity as controlled by domestic law, and they have
in a number of cases applied such immunity to alleged human rights
abuses.  The limited and targeted congressional interventions in this
area only confirm the propriety  of this approach.
C.  Back to Pinochet
The U.S.  practice  with respect  to domestic  immunities  in  civil
suits  alleging  human  rights  abuses  confirms  that  "[w]hether  and
how the United States wishe[s] to react to [international law claims
raised in its domestic courts] are domestic questions.' 43  This point
has  special  force  in  the  context  of  civil  human  rights  litigation,
where the ideals of the underlying law clash with the exigencies  of
international politics.  The federal political branches  have resolved
this tension largely, although not exclusively, in favor of immunities
for foreign  sovereigns  and officials, even for violations of the most
serious of international human rights law.  Courts have deferred  to
the political branches on this point, and, as a result, have refused to
countenance  claims that international human  rights law overrides
domestic immunities.
The U.S. approach to the relationship between domestic human
rights  litigation  and  international  immunities  differs  from  the
British approach in Pinochet. As noted above, these differences are
explained in part by differences in domestic law.  Even at a broader
level, however, the Pinochet case  is  not inconsistent  with the  U.S.
approach.  As several  Law Lords acknowledged,  there  are impor-
tant functional differences between immunity in the criminal extra-
dition  context  and  immunity  in  the  context  of  civil  litigation.144
Whether in the civil  or criminal context, one nation's examination
of the validity of another nation's human rights record directly im-
plicates international relations.  In the criminal extradition  or pros-
ecution  context,  however,  the  executive  branch  has  the  duty,
expertise,  and  discretion  to  accommodate  such  foreign  relations
143.  Hilao v. Marcos,  25 F.3d 1467,1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
144.  As Lord Millett noted, there is  "nothing illogical or contrary to public policy in de-
nying the victims  of state  sponsored torture the right to sue the offending state in  a foreign
court while  at the same time  permitting (and indeed  requiring)  other states  to  convict  or
punish the individuals responsible if the offending state declines to take action."  Second Law
Lords' Decision,  [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827,  914 (H.L.) (Lord Millett); see also [1999]  2 W.L.R.  at
892, 899 (Lord Hutton),  916 (Lord Phillips).
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trol  of  private  plaintiffs,  many  of  whom  are  noncitizens,  and
unelected judges.  In this context, a broader and more rule-like ap-
proach to immunity doctrine makes sense.  Otherwise U.S. foreign
relations  decision-making  would in effect be  delegated to  foreign
human rights victims  and federal courts.  However noble the aims
of international human  rights litigation,  these  actors  are  not well
suited to assess U.S. foreign relations interests.145
In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Law Lords expressly
encouraged Britain's Home Secretary to reconsider  his decision to
allow extradition proceedings  against Pinochet to go forward,  even
though the Law Lords had determined that there was a valid legal
basis to proceed with extradition.  In other words, they understood
that their decision would not be the final word on Pinochet's extra-
dition, and they believed that, even if the case for extradition were
legally sufficient, it might be outweighed by political considerations.
The Home  Secretary  ultimately  ruled that the extradition  should
proceed.  His decision, however, was based on just the sort of bal-
ancing of legal and political considerations-including the likely ef-
fect  of extradition  on  Great Britain's relations  with  Chile  and  on
Chile's internal stability-that is not available in private  civil litiga-
tion.146  Because of the unavailability of such a balancing process, it
is not surprising that the political branches  would impose  stricter
limits  in this  context  on the extent  to which international  human
rights law developments  can override domestic immunities. 47
IV.  HEAD-OF-STATE  IMMUNITY  AND  THE DOMESTIC  STATUS  OF
CUSTOMARY  INTERNATIONAL  LAW
The Law Lords'  use of international  law to limit  domestic  im-
munities is not the only way in which the Pinochet  decision  is rele-
vant to international human rights litigation in U.S. courts.  It also
is relevant  to the claim,  often made in this litigation,  that CIL is
self-executing federal common law, to be "applied by courts in the
United States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented
145.  It  is  important  to keep in mind  that the United States  is  unique in the  extent to
which  it  permits  civil  international  human  rights  litigation  between  foreign  parties.  See
Ralph  G.  Steinhardt,  Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga:  Litigating Human Rights Claims
Against the Estate of Ferdinand  Marcos,  20 YALE J. INTL. L. 65,  101  (1995); Beth Stephens,
Litigating Customary International  Human Rights Norms, 25  GA. J. INMT. &  COMP. L.  191,
200 (1996).
146.  See supra text accompanying note 44.
147.  In Part V, we discuss more generally the United States' resistance to the incorpora-
tion of international human rights law into the U.S. legal  system.
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by  Congress. '148  This  claim, which  we have  termed the "modern
position,"'149 has been central to the success of human rights litiga-
tion in U.S. courts because it allows for the judicial incorporation of
international human rights law without the need for express polit-
ical branch  approval.  At first glance, the modern position  resem-
bles  the British  rule,  referred  to  by  some  of the Law  Lords  in
Pinochet,  that the law of nations is incorporated into the domestic
common  law.150  In  addition,  proponents  of  the modern  position
have invoked the example of head-of-state immunity, which was  at
issue  in Pinochet, as  a particularly  compelling  confirmation  of the
modern position.
We  have  extensively  critiqued  the  modern  position  in  other
writings.15'  In this Part, we use the head-of-state  immunity exam-
ple to further develop our critique.  As we explain, U.S. courts his-
torically  did apply something akin to the British rule of automatic
incorporation  of  CIL,  but  that  regime  did  not  survive  Erie  v.
Tompkins.152  Instead, courts  after Erie have applied CIL  rules, in-
cluding  CIL  rules of immunity, only when and  to the extent  they
believe  they  are  authorized  to  do  so  by  the  federal  political
branches.  The failure of courts to embrace  the modern position in
the immunity  context,  where  it would  seem  to  be most justified,
casts substantial  doubt  on the claim that it  allows  for the judicial
incorporation  of international  human rights  law.  As a result,  in-
stead  of confirming  the modern  position,  as its proponents  have
maintained, the example of head-of-state immunity actually  weak-
ens the case for it.
148.  Louis Henkin, International  Law as Law in the United  States, 82 MicH. L. REv. 1555,
1561  (1984)  [hereinafter International  Law as Law].
149.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International  Law as Federal
Common Law: A  Critique  of the Modern Position,  110 HARv.  L. REv. 815, 815  (1997)  [here-
inafter A Critique]. As we have explained, the modem position is appropriately described  as
"modem"  because  it  was  embraced  in a  judicial  decision  for  the  first  time  in  1980,  see
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,  885 (2d Cir. 1980),  and has risen to academic orthodoxy
only since that decision, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 831-37.
150.  See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 912 (Lord Millett) ("Customary
international law  is  part  of  the common law ....  "); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50
(K.B.  1767);  4 WILLiAM  BLACKS'TONE,  COMMENTARIES  *67.  The  "law  of nations"  is  the
traditional term for customary international  law.
151.  See Bradley  &  Goldsmith, A  Critique, supra note 149; Bradley  &  Goldsmith,  The
Current  Illegitimacy, supra note 88; Curtis A. Bradley  & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts
and the Incorporation  of International  Law, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2260 (1998)  [hereinafter Fed-
eral Courts].
152.  Erie Railroad  Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64  (1938).
2160 [Vol.  97:2129
HeinOnline -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2160 1998-1999A.  Head-of-State Immunity and Erie
To understand  the significance  of the  head-of-state  immunity
practice  for the modem position debate, it is important first to un-
derstand how U.S. courts traditionally  applied CIL rules  of immu-
nity, and how Erie v.  Tompkins altered this practice.  For most of
our nation's history, head-of-state immunity was viewed  as a com-
ponent of foreign sovereign immunity. 5 3  Prior to Erie,  federal and
state courts alike applied the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity on
the domestic plane without authorization from Congress or the Ex-
ecutive.  Thus, for example, in the 1812 Schooner Exchange deci-
sion,  the Supreme  Court applied  the  CIL of sovereign  immunity
without bothering to  consider  domestic authorization  to do  So.
154
Similarly, in Hatch v. Baez,'55 a New York court relied on an Eng-
lish precedent but no domestic authorization in holding that the for-
mer President of the Dominican Republic was entitled to immunity
for his official acts.
In these  and other cases, state  and federal courts  applied  CIL
immunities as part of the "general" common law most famously as-
sociated with Swift v. Tyson.156  As a form of general common law,
the CIL immunities  were  available  as  a source  of law  in domestic
litigation.  But this CIL did not have the status  of federal  law and
thus  had few  implications  beyond  its  use  in particular  decisions.
State courts were not bound by federal court determinations  of the
content of this CIL or the procedures  by which it was identified.157
The Supreme Court could not review state court interpretations  of
the  CIL  of  international  immunity  because  such  interpretations
were not matters of federal law. 58  And, although state and federal
courts were bound by the Executive's determination of whether to
recognize  a foreign government, they interpreted  the CIL of inter-
153.  See Schooner Exchange v. MeFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137  (1812); RESTATE-
MENT  (SEcoND)  OF FOREIGN  RELATIONS  LAW  § 66  (1965); Peter  D.  Trooboff, Foreign State
Immunity:  Emerging Consensus on Principles,  200 RECUEIL  DES  CouRs  235, 252 (1986 V).
154. See Schooner Exchange, 11  U.S. at 147.
155.  14 N.Y. Sup.  Ct. 596, 600  (1876).
156.  41  U.S.  (16  Pet.) 1  (1842).
157.  See G. Edward  White,  The Transformation of the Constitutional  Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85  VA.  L. REv. 1,  27-28  (1999);  see also QuINCY  WRiGTrr,  THE  CONTROL  OF
AMERICAN  FOREIGN RELATIONS  161  (1922)  (noting that a "state constitution  or legislative
provision in violation of customary international law is valid unless in conflict with a Federal
constitutional provision or an act of Congress").
158.  See Wulfsohn  v.  Russian  Socialist Federated  Republic,  266 U.S.  580,  580  (1924);
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Hendren,  92 U.S. 286, 286-87  (1875).
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national  immunity  independent  of  the  views  of  the  executive
branch.
159
During the pre-Erie period, then, U.S. courts, in applying  CIL
rules of immunity, followed something akin to the British automatic
incorporation rule.  Erie's abrogation  of general common law, and
its insistence that all law applied by federal courts be grounded in
the Constitution  or  a federal  enactment,  called  this practice  into
question.  Proponents  of the modem position assert that after Erie,
the automatic incorporation  rule continued  but that CIL assumed
the status of self-executing federal common law rather than general
common law.160  If this assertion were correct, one would expect to
see courts embracing the modern position in the many international
immunity cases decided in the years following Erie. But that is not
what happened.  Instead,  around  the  time  of Erie, the  Supreme
Court stopped applying the CIL of immunity on its own authority,
as it had done under the general common law regime, and began to
justify  its application on the  basis of executive branch authoriza-
tion.161  The law so applied was, to be sure, federal law.  It was fed-
eral law by virtue of a political-branch  authorization, however, and
not an independent judicial power to incorporate  CIL.
The trend away from the automatic incorporation of CIL immu-
nity principles  as  nonfederal  law to the authorized  application  of
these principles  as federal law began the year Erie was decided.  In
The Navemar,1 62 decided just three months before Erie and issued
the day Erie was argued, the Court intimated for the first time that
courts were bound by executive suggestions of immunity.163  Subse-
quently, in its 1943 Ex parte Republic of Peru 164 decision, the Court
squarely held that, because immunity determinations implicated im-
159.  See, e.g.,  Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926)  (granting immunity
even though  State Department had argued in the lower court that immunity should not be
granted); see also White, supra note 157, at 134.
160.  See, e.g., Henkin, International  Law as Law, supra note 148, at 1561; Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International  Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824,  1831-33  (1998)  [here-
inafter State Law].
161.  As noted in the House Report  accompanying the enactment  of the FSIA, "In  the
early part of this century, the Supreme Court began to place less emphasis on whether immu-
nity was supported by the law and practice of nations, and relied instead on the practices and
policies  of the  State Department."  H.R. Rl-P. No.  94-1487, at 8  (1976),  reprinted  in  1976
U.S.C.C.A.N.  6604, 6606.
162.  Compania  Espanola  de Navigacion  Maritima,  S.A.  v.  The  Navemar, 303  U.S.  68
(1938)  [hereinafter  The Navemar].
163.  The Court stated that, upon receipt of a suggestion of immunity from the executive
branch, it was the "duty"  of the courts to grant immunity.  See The Navemar,  303 U.S. at 74.
For a  discussion  of how  The Navemar constituted  a break  from prior practice,  see White,
supra note  157, at 134-41.
164.  318 U.S. 578  (1943).
2162 [Vol. 97:2129
HeinOnline -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2162 1998-1999portant foreign relations interests, courts were bound to follow ex-
ecutive suggestions of immunity.165  Two years later, in Republic of
Mexico v.  Hoffman,166 the Court went further, stating that even in
the face of executive-branch silence, U.S.  courts should look to "the
principles  accepted by the [executive  branch]."' 67  As a result, the
Court explained that "[it is ...  not for the courts to deny an immu-
nity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an im-
munity on new grounds which  the government  has not seen fit to
recognize."' 68  These Supreme Court decisions formed the basis for
the lower courts'  consistent post-Erie, pre-FSIA practice of relying
on executive branch guidance and principles to justify the domestic
application  of sovereign  iMmunity.
169
The Supreme Court never expressly tied its shift in treatment of
foreign  sovereign  immunity  doctrines  to  Erie. But the shift took
place at approximately the same time  as Erie, and it is easy to un-
derstand why Erie was pivotal.  Before Erie, the automatic applica-
tion of CIL as general common law had relatively few constitutional
implications:  it did  not supersede  state  law  or affect  state court
practice; it did not create a new basis for federal jurisdiction; and it
did not bind the Executive.  Once Erie eliminated this form  of law
in our constitutional  system, however,  federal  courts could  apply
CIL on their own authority only as federal common law, with more
serious  constitutional  consequences.  If  CIL  were  self-executing
165.  See 318 U.S.  at 588-89.
166.  324 U.S. 30  (1945).
167. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35.
168.  Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35.
169.  See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir.
1971); Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964).  See generally
Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity - The Case of the "Imias," 68 AM.  J. INcir  L. 280, 281
(1974);  Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim  - The Haiti Case, 49
N.Y.U. L. Ray. 377, 389-90 (1974).  The lower courts deferred to the Executive even when its
suggestions were not consistent with  CIL.  See Leigh, supra, at 281  (citing Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) and Chemical Natural  Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela,
215  A.2d  864 (1966)).  In cases  in which the Executive  made  no  suggestion of immunity,
several  courts  stated  that  the  matter  was  for  "judicial  determination."  See,  e.g.,  Flota
Maritima  Browning de Cuba  v. Motor Vessel  Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619,  623  (4th
Cir.  1964);  National  Am.  Corp.  v. Federal  Republic  of Nigeria,  420  F.  Supp.  954,  956
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Aerotrade,  Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281, 1282-83  (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Anaconda Co. v. Corporacion del Cobre, 55 F.R.D. 16,18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).  But these
determinations  were always guided  by the State Department's policies  as articulated in the
Tate letter, see infra note 174 and accompanying text, and "several cases...  used the State
Department's failure to intercede after being asked to do so as one basis for denial of immu-
nity," Lowenfeld, supra, at 390.  See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 487-89  (1983)  (noting that when foreign nations did not seek immunity from the execu-
tive branch, "the responsibility  fell to the courts to determine whether  sovereign immunity
existed, generally by reference  to prior State Department  decisions").
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U.S. federal common law, then it would provide a basis for "arising
under" federal jurisdiction under Article III, supersede inconsistent
state  law under  Article VI,  and  might  bind  the  President  under
Article H's "take  care" clause.170  Especially in the absence of any
apparent constitutional  authorization for the federalization  of CIL,
it is not surprising that courts would seek political-branch  authori-
zation before embracing these changes in the domestic significance
of CIL. As we have just seen, this is precisely what happened in the
immunity context.171
This posture was especially appropriate  because,  at the time of
Erie, the CIL of immunity was in the midst of a transformation that
rendered  it less  amenable  to  independent  judicial  determination.
During the nineteenth century, the United States, like many other
countries, adhered to the "absolute"  theory of sovereign immunity,
under which foreign governments were entitled to immunity for es-
sentially all of their acts, even those that were purely commercial in
nature.172  In  the early  twentieth  century,  however,  a number  of
countries  began  embracing  the  "restrictive"  theory,  under  which
foreign governments were  entitled to immunity for their public  or
sovereign acts, but not for their private or commercial  acts.173  This
shift to the restrictive  theory, formally endorsed  by the U.S. State
Department in 1952,174 made the CIL of immunity much more com-
plex and difficult to apply.'75  It also meant that foreign sovereigns
170. For a discussion of these implications,  see Bradley &  Goldsmith, A  Critique, supra
note 149, at 838-48.
171.  A similar  shift took place in the context of the act of state doctrine.  This doctrine
traditionally was justified by reference  to the international  law principle of sovereign equal-
ity.  See supra note 132.  As we have just seen, however, Erie rendered problematic  the auto-
matic incorporation of international  law doctrines.  It is thus no surprise  that, at about the
time of Erie, the Supreme  Court began to reconceptualize  the doctrine increasingly in  do-
mestic law terms.  In both United States v. Belmont, 301  U.S. 324, 328-30  (1937)  and  United
States v.  Pink, 315  U.S. 203,  229-33  (1942),  the  Court  grounded the  doctrine  not only in
sovereign  equality but also  in the  federal  government's,  especially  the Executive's,  broad
power  over foreign  affairs.  This reconceptualization  culminated  in Sabbatino, where  the
Supreme Court eschewed the international law basis for the doctrine altogether, justifying it
solely in terms of separation of powers.  By grounding the doctrine in such "'constitutional'
underpinnings,"  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423  (1964),  the Court
provided a basis for concluding that there was domestic authorization to treat the doctrine as
federal  common law.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, A  Critique,  supra note 149,  at 859-61.
172. See GAMAL MouRsi  BADR, STATE  ImMUNITY:  AN ANALYTICAL  AND  PROGNOSTIC
Vmw  9-20  (1984)  (outlining  the  pre-20th  century  history  of the  doctrine  in  the  United
States).
173.  See id. at 21-62 (describing  the transition from absolute to restrictive  immunity).
174. See Letter from Jack B. Tate,  Acting  Legal Advisor, to Philip  B.  Perlman, Acting
Attorney  General (May 19,  1952),  in 26 DEPT. ST. BuLL. 984,  984-85 (1952).
175.  See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States  - A Proposal  for Reform
of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 901,  906-09 (1969);  Lowenfeld,  Litigating a Sover-
eign Immunity Claim, supra note 169,  at 384.
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would be hailed into court more often, thereby heightening the for-
eign policy stakes  associated with immunity  determinations. 176  In
this environment, it made sense that unelected judges with no for-
eign  relations  expertise  would  seek  political-branch  guidance  on
whether  and how to apply foreign  sovereign immunity.177
B.  Modern Practice
It does not follow from the above analysis that case-by-case ex-
ecutive-branch authorization is the optimal process for the domestic
incorporation of international immunities.  This process was, among
other  things,  politicized  and  unpredictable, 178  and  dissatisfaction
with it  eventually led  Congress in  1976  to  enact the FSIA.179  In
effect, the FSIA transferred  the political branch  authorization for
judicial application  of foreign  sovereign  immunity  from executive
suggestion  to  congressional  statute.  The  FSIA  does  not  specify
whether its  immunities  extend  to heads  of state, either current  or
former. 80  The FSIA defines  "foreign state" to include a "political
subdivision"  or an "agency  or instrumentality" of a foreign state,'"'
but neither the statute nor its legislative  history mentions head-of-
state immunity.' 82
This  silence  raises  the question  of whether  a foreign  head  of
state is entitled to immunity in U.S.  courts after the FSIA, and if so,
176.  The Supreme  Court had acknowledged the foreign policy implications  of exposing
foreign sovereigns to suit in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36  (1945).
177.  Cf Lawrence  Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpre-
tive Theory, 110 HAnv. L. REv. 1785 (1997)  (giving general theoretical account of why judges
seek political branch authorization when judicial practices become political or controversial).
178.  See  Lowenfeld,  supra note  175,  at 909,  913;  Frederic  Alan  Weber,  The  Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE  STUD.  WoRLD
PuB.  ORD. 1,  11-13, 15-17 (1976).
179.  See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,486-89 (1983); GARY B.
BoRN, ITrrERNATnONAL  CrvrL LTGATION  N UNrrED  STATES CouRTs  210-11  (3d ed. 1996).
180.  Mark Feldman,  a  participant in the  drafting  of the  FSIA,  explained  the  statute's
silence on the head-of-state immunity issue as follows:  "Frankly, we forgot about it [head-of-
state immunity], or didn't know enough about it at the time, during those two or three critical
years when the statute was being formulated."  Panel, Foreign Governments in United States
Courts, 85 AM. Socy. INT.  L. PRoc. 251, 276 (1991)  (remarks of Mark Feldman during panel
discussion).  By contrast,  the sovereign  immunity statutes  in a  number of other  countries,
including Australia, Canada, and of course Britain, expressly refer to head-of-state immunity.
See Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, No. 196, chs. 3(3)(b), 36 (1985)  (Austr.), reprinted  in
25 I.L.M. 715; Act to Provide for State Immunity  in Canadian  Courts, 1982, R.S.C.,  ch. 95
(1982), reprinted  in 21 I.L.M. 798; State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33 (1978)  (Eng.), reprinted  in
17  I.L.M. 1123.
181.  28  U.S.C. §  1603(a)  (1994).  The FSIA's  definition  of "agency  or instrumentality"
does not appear to encompass  natural persons,  since it refers to "any entity...  which  is  a
separate legal person, corporate  or otherwise."  § 1603(b)  (emphasis added).
182.  See Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86  CoLum. L. REv. 169,  174  (1986).
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on what basis.  If the modem position were correct, the basis would
be easy to find:  head-of-state  immunity, as part of CIL, would ap-
ply automatically as federal common law, notwithstanding  the  ab-
sence  of  political  branch  authorization.  In fact,  however,  of  the
many decisions in which courts have considered  and applied head-
of-state immunity since enactment of the FSIA, not a single one has
applied head-of-state immunity as self-executing  CIL.  To the con-
trary,  consistent  with  the  post-Erie requirement  that  all  federal
common law be authorized by the Constitution or enacted federal
law, these courts  continue to seek authorization  from the political
branches to apply head-of-state immunity.
Some courts, for example, view the FSIA as providing for head-
of-state immunity, even  though the  text of the statute is silent  on
the issue.1 83  Other courts view the FSIA as inapplicable to a head
of state and instead look to executive branch authorization to apply
the  doctrine.'84  Among  the  courts  that  seek  executive  branch
authorization,  some  recognize  head-of-state  immunity  only in  the
face  of  an  explicit  suggestion  of  immunity  by  the  Executive.1 85
Others rely on the lack of an executive branch suggestion simply as
a factor weighing against immunity.8 6  Importantly, in all  of these
cases,  courts ground head-of-state immunity in  a federal political
branch authorization 87  Contrary to the modem position, courts in
183.  See, e.g.,  O'Hair  v. Wojtyla,  No. 79-2463  (D.D.C. Oct.  3, 1979),  excerpted in State
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities,  1979 DIGEsT § 7, at 897.  More gener-
ally, a number of courts have construed the FSIA to confer immunity on individual officials.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
184.  See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206,  1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128,  137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Kilroy v. Wimdsor, No. C78-291  (N.D.  Ohio
Dec. 7,  1978), excerpted in State Representation, 1978  DIGEST § 3, at 641-43.
185.  See, e.g., Jungquist v. Nahyan,  940 F. Supp. 312, 321  (D.D.C. 1996).
186.  See, e.g., First American Corp. v. AI-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp.  1107, 1121 (D.D.C. 1996);
cf.  Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212 (inferring absence of immunity for Manuel Noriega  from execu-
tive branch's enforcement action against Noriega in Panama).  Estate of Domingo v. Marcos
provides a good  illustration of the extent  of executive  control  in this  area.  See Estate  of
Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1055-V (W.D.  Wash. Dec. 23,  1982), excerpted in State Terri-
tory, Jurisdiction,  and  Jurisdictional Immunities,  2  CMULAurrvE  DIGEST 1981-1988  § 7,  at
1564-66 (1995).  The court initially granted immunity to Ferdinand Marcos based on an exec-
utive suggestion.  Subsequently, the Executive changed its position and suggested a denial of
immunity, and  the court then  followed  that suggestion.  See Estate of Domingo, No. C82-
1055-V, in  2 CumtuLATarvE  DIGESr, supra, at 1568-69.  Compare Estate of Domingo v. Repub-
lic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782,786 (W.D. Wash.  1988) (denying immunity to Marcos
and noting that "although the State Department filed a suggestion of immunity when Marcos
was president, it has not fied a new suggestion of immunity") with Psinakis v. Marcos, No.
C75-1725-RHS  (N.D. Cal.  1975), excerpted in State Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional
Immunities, 1975  DIGEST § 7, at 344-45  (honoring a suggestion  of immunity for then-Presi-
dent Marcos).
187. But cf In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40,45 (2d Cir. 1988)  (stating in dicta that "[w]hen  lacking
guidance from the  executive  branch, as here, a  court is  left to decide  for itself whether  a
head-of-state is or is  not entitled to immunity").
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applies as self-executing  federal common law.
C.  Significance for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts
This account  of the way in which  courts have treated head-of-
state immunity has important implications for the broader  debate
over the legitimacy of the modem position and, as a result, over the
legitimacy  of international  human rights  litigation  in U.S.  courts.
The modem position has been central to this litigation for two rea-
sons.  The first is a technical but important jurisdictional point.  The
typical international human rights lawsuit involves a foreign plain-
tiff suing a foreign official in U.S. court for human rights abuses that
took place on foreign soil.  The plaintiff usually sues under the ATS,
which,  as noted above,  states that the federal district  courts  shall
have jurisdiction over any civil  action "by an alien for a tort only,
committed  in violation  of  the  law  of  nations  or  a treaty  of the
United  States. '18 8  The  Article  III  basis  for  alien-versus-alien
human rights  cases is uncertain, however, because  the parties  are
not diverse,189 and the plaintiffs  do not (for reasons explained be-
low) seek relief under  a treaty.190  Here  is where the modern posi-
tion  comes  in, because  if CIL is  federal common  law, then  ATS
suits can plausibly be viewed as "arising under" federal 'law for pur-
poses  of Article  III.  This indeed was  the holding  of the Filartiga
decision  that  initiated  the  modern  human  rights  litigation
movement.191
The second reason the modern position is important to human
rights litigation concerns substantive law.  Most of the principles of
international  human  rights law invoked  in domestic  litigation  are
contained in multilateral treaties.192  U.S. courts cannot apply these
treaties,  however,  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  United  States  has
failed  to  ratify  a number  of  them.193  Second,  when  the  United
188.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
189.  The Supreme Court has long held that alien-versus-alien suits do not fall within Arti-
cle III's diversity clause.  See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303,304 (1809).
190.  Article III includes within its categories  of federal judicial power "Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under ...  Treaties."  U.S. CONs-r.  art. III, § 2, cl.  1.
191.  See Flartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,  885  (2d Cir. 1980).
192.  See,  e.g.,  Louis  HENKIN,  INTERNATIONAL  LAW:  PoLmIcs  AND VALuES  36 (1995)
[hereinafter  PoLmcs AND  VALuEs]; Louis B. Sohn, The New International  Law: Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv.  1,  12 (1982).
193.  For example, the United States has not ratified either the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, B.T.S. 44 (1992), cm.  1976 (Eng.), 28 I.L.M. 1448, or the
Convention  on the Elimination  of All Forms  of Discrimination  Against Women,  adopted
Dec. 18,  1979,  1249 U.N.T.S.  13.
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States  has ratified human  rights treaties, it has insisted, through  a
series  of reservations,  understandings,  and  declarations  (RUDs),
that the treaties cannot be used as a source of law in domestic litiga-
tion.194  The modern position provides a way for courts to apply the
norms in these treaties as domestic law despite this political branch
resistance because, through a process that remains obscure and con-
troversial, human rights treaties are viewed as giving rise to an inde-
pendently  valid  CIL of  human  rights.195  Under  the  modern
position, this treaty-derived  CIL  can be applied as domestic law in
human rights cases  even though the treaties themselves  cannot be
applied  domestically  either because  of lack  of  ratification  or be-
cause  of the RUDs.  In this  way,  the modem  position  "compen-
sate[s] for the  abstinence of the United States  vis-d-vis ratification
of international human rights treaties.' 9 6
Some of the  problems  with the  modem position are  apparent
from this description of the relationship between the CIL of human
rights  and  human  rights  treaties.197  It  is generally  accepted  that
federal  common  law must  be  authorized  in  some  fashion  by the
Constitution or federal statute, and that federal common law is de-
fined and limited by the actions of the federal political branches. 198
As a result, it seems illegitimate for federal courts to apply as  do-
mestic  law  a  CIL of human  rights  based  almost  exclusively  on
human rights treaties that the political branches have taken pains to
ensure  do not apply  as domestic  law.  Such a federal common law
seems  especially  inappropriate  because  other  federal  enactments
194.  See generally Louis  Henkin,  U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:  The
Ghost of  Senator  Bricker,  89 AM J.  IrN-L. L. 341 (1995) [hereinafter Ghost of Senator  Bricker];
David P. Stewart,  United  States Ratification  of the Covenant  on Civil and Political  Rights:  The
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings,  and Declarations,  42 DEPAUL L. Rv.  1183
(1993).
195.  For endorsements  of this process, see  HENI rN, PoLrrmcs  AND  VALuES, supra note
192, at 37-44; Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution  and International  Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INTL.  L. 851,  856-58  (1989);  Louis  B. Sohn,  The New International  Law:  Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 12  (1982).  For criticism,  see
Simma  & Alston, supra note 67;  J.S. Watson,  Legal Theory, Efficacy  and Validity in the
Development of Human Rights Norms in International  Law, 1979  U. ILL.  LEGAL F. 609.
196.  Simma & Alston, supra note  67,  at 87; see also Lillich,  supra note 195,  at 856-57
(making a similar point); Bradley  & Goldsmith, Federal  Courts, supra note 151  (same).
197.  For a more comprehensive analysis of these problems, see Bradley  & Goldsmith, A
Critique,  supra note 149.
198.  See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.  Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942)
(Jackson,  J., concurring)  ("[Federal common law implements the Federal Constitution and
statutes, and is conditioned by them."); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938)
("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State.").  See generally Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking
Power of the Federal  Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 263, 286-88  (1992).
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199
When attempting to justify the modern position, its proponents
tend not to  address  these  separation  of powers  objections  to the
automatic judicial incorporation of CIL.  They concentrate  instead
on federalism objections, which they dismiss because of a purported
need  for national  uniformity  in foreign  affairs.  In  addition, they
avoid  emphasizing  international  human rights  law issues,  such  as
the death  penalty,  because  such  issues  implicate  traditional  state
prerogatives  and thus are difficult to justify as  an exclusive federal
concern.  They instead point to traditional CIL governing relations
between nations, which appears to trigger an exclusive federal pre-
rogative  and thus  seems easier to justify  as  an  exercise  of federal
common law.  In particular, recent defenses of the modern position
have rested heavily on the example  of the CIL of immunity.
Consider, for example, Harold Koh's recent defense of the mod-
ern position.200  Koh reasoned  that if CIL did not apply automati-
cally  as  domestic  federal  law,  "Massachusetts  [could]  deny  the
customary  international  law protection  of head-of-state  immunity
to Queen Elizabeth on tort claims arising out of events in Northern
Ireland, whereas the forty-nine other states could choose instead to
grant the Queen every conceivable  variant of full or partial immu-
nity.''201 Koh similarly suggested that rejection of the modern posi-
tion would mean that "federal judges sitting in New York diversity
actions  filed  against  Imelda  Marcos,  Lee  Teng-hui,  Benjamin
Netanyahu,  Yasser  Arafat,  or  Pope  John  Paul  II  would  have  to
guess whether the New York  Court of Appeals  would accord  each
or  all  of  these  defendants  head-of-state  immunity. '2 02  Koh  con-
cluded  from  these  examples  that it  is  "radical"  and  "bizarre"  to
question  the proposition that CIL has the status of federal  law.2 3
Two points are worth noting regarding Koh's use of the head-of-
state  immunity example to justify the modern  position.  First, the
example is misleading to the extent that it suggests that the modern
position is necessary in order to ensure state compliance with tradi-
tional CIL.  In fact, the modern position is not needed for this pur-
pose because the political branches  have already  codified by treaty
199.  See supra text accompanying notes 133-42.  For further discussion,  see infra Part V.
200.  See Koh, State Law, supra  note 160; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel
Lecture: Bringing International  Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623  (1998).
201.  Koh, State Law, supra note 160, at 1829.
202.  Id. at 1850.
203.  See id. at 1828,  1850.
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or statute almost all of the traditional CIL that is relevant to domes-
tic litigation,  rendering  traditional  CIL practically  irrelevant  as  a
rule of decision or defense in domestic litigation.  Head-of-state im-
munity is  a  truly  exceptional  example  of a  traditional  CIL  norm
potentially relevant to domestic litigation that is not expressly codi-
fied in enacted federal law.204
Second,  and more importantly, courts apply head-of-state immu-
nity in a fashion that is inconsistent with the modern position. They
ground  the application  of head-of-state  immunity in authorization
by the political  branches,  usually the Executive.  Modern  position
proponents invoke the head-of-state  immunity example because it
is a traditional  rule  of CIL that directly  implicates  relations  with
foreign nations and thus presents the best possible context in which
to justify the modern position.  But courts do not, in fact, embrace
the modern  position even  in this  most favorable  of contexts.  In-
stead,  they seek  political-branch  authorization  to  apply  CIL,  and
they take  care to  ensure  that the  law so  applied  conforms  to the
policies of the political branches.  To return to one of Koh's  exam-
ples, rejection  of the modern  position  does not mean  that courts
would  deny  head-of-state  immunity  protection  to  the  Queen  of
England.  It simply means that they would  not confer such immu-
nity directly under  CIL, but rather would do so in accordance  with
the wishes of the executive  branch, which has the lead role in con-
ducting U.S. foreign policy with England.
This practice has important implications for the claim that a CIL
of human rights applies as domestic federal law even in the absence
of political-branch  authorization.  The CIL of human rights is more
difficult  to defend  than traditional CIL as an area of federal  com-
mon law.  Unlike traditional CIL, the CIL of human rights overlaps
substantially  with traditional state prerogatives  and thus should be
federalized,  if  at  all,  only  by  the  democratically  elected  federal
political branches  where  state interests  are represented. 20 5  More-
204.  Gerald  Neuman  contends  that  another  such  example  is  consular  immunity.  See
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary  International  Law: A Response to
Professors  Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FosRIAM  L. REv. 371,377 n.37, 382, 391 (1997).  CIL
rules governing consular immunity,  however, have been codified  in the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations,  Apr. 24, 1963,  21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.  261,  a multilateral treaty
that has been ratified by most nations  of the world, including the United States.  See United
Nations,  United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral  Treaties deposited with  the Secretary
General,  Chapter  3 (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.un.org/DeptsFTreaty>  (registration re-
quired)  (reporting that 163  nations had ratified this treaty  as of June  1999).  Since  the U.S.
ratification of the Convention in  1969, there has not been a single case in U.S. courts involv-
ing the CIL of consular immunity.
205.  See Thomas  Merrill,  The  Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.  CHi.  L.
REv. 1,  17  (1985)  (explaining why "[flederal  courts...  should not promulgate federal com-
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over, the political  branches  have affirmatively  resisted the whole-
sale  judicial  incorporation  of  the  CIL of  human  rights.206  As  a
result, the  modem  position  seems  especially  questionable  in  the
context  in which  it  most  matters  - international  human  rights
litigation.
The questionable  basis  for the modem  position in the human
rights context  presents  a  puzzle.  Why would courts  embrace  the
modem position  in the substantive  human  rights  law context  but
not in the head-of-state  immunity context, given that the justifica-
tions for the practice  seem weaker in the former?  The puzzle  is
solved when one sees that, contrary to academic assertions and ju-
dicial dicta, courts for the most part have not embraced the modern
position with respect to the  CIL  of human rights.
The  decisions  that come  closest to  embracing  the proposition
that a CIL of human  rights applies  as  self-executing  federal com-
mon law  are in human  rights cases  litigated under the ATS.  The
watershed case, Filartiga,  definitely relied on this proposition in up-
holding the constitutionality of the ATS.2 07  While later cases often
repeat this proposition in dicta, they tend to apply a CIL  of human
rights in a  fashion  that is consistent  with  the political-branch  au-
thorization requirement.  For example, in the large majority of suc-
cessful international human rights cases, courts hold that Congress
in the ATS created a domestic federal cause of action for violations
of  the  CIL of  human  rights.208  Less  often,  courts  hold  that
Congress in the ATS authorized courts to develop a CIL  of federal
common law.209  Some commentators  have challenged these inter-
pretations of the ATS. 210  The pertinent point for now, however, is
that,  rightly  or  wrongly  as  a matter  of  statutory  interpretation,
courts view the ATS as having authorized the incorporation of CIL
into  domestic law.
mon law rules that intrude upon [the traditional domain of the states] unless they have been
authorized to do so by an enacting body in which the states are represented").
206.  See supra text accompanying notes 133-42, 194; see also infra Part V.
207.  See supra text accompanying notes  91,  189-91.
208.  See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d  1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493,  503  (9th Cir. 1991); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179-84  (D. Mass.  1995);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207,212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Handel v. Artukovic,  601 F. Supp. 1421,  1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
209.  See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d  844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
210.  See, e.g., Bradley  &  Goldsmith,  The Current  Illegitimacy, supra note 88, at 358-63;
Alfred  P.  Rubin,  U.S.  Tort Suits  by  Aliens  Based on  International Law,  ITL.  PR~c.
NoTaBooK, Jan. 1983, at 19, 20-23; Sweeney, supra  note 88; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811-16  (D.C. Cir. 1984)  (Bork, J., concurring).
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Further evidence  that courts  do not view  CIL as federal  com-
mon law beyond the extent authorized by Congress can be found in
judicial resistance  to  applying  a  CIL of human rights to  domestic
officials.  If the modem position were  correct, courts should  apply
the ostensible  CIL of human rights, like other federal  law, to  do-
mestic officials.  But federal courts do not in fact do so.  They defer
to  congressional  statutes  that  violate  customary  international
human rights law.21'  They generally do not apply customary inter-
national human rights law to limit executive  action. 2 12  In addition,
although there is a widespread academic consensus that the CIL of
human  rights  should  override  inconsistent  state  law  under  the
supremacy  clause,213  U.S.  courts  have  never  applied  CIL  in this
fashion, and they show no inclination to do so.
V.  WHY  RESIST THE  DOMESTIC INCORPORATION  OF
INTERNATIONAL  HUMAN  RIGHTS  LAW?
We have argued in this article that the federal political branches
have,  with  limited  exceptions,  taken  steps  to  limit  international
human  rights  litigation  in  U.S.  courts.  In  particular,  they  have
granted foreign states and their officials broad immunities from suit
and  they have largely  resisted the domestic  incorporation  of sub-
stantive  international human  rights law.  We  have further  argued
that courts  should be,  and generally  have  been,  faithful to  these
political branch actions.  Why have our elected  officials resisted the
incorporation of international human rights law into civil litigation?
And  why  do  we  maintain  that  federal  courts  in  such  litigation
should not play an independent role in the incorporation of interna-
tional human rights norms?
Our answer  to  these  questions  is not  based  on  skepticism  re-
garding  either  the aims  of international  human  rights law  or  the
legitimacy of international  law generally.  It is instead based on the
view that the use of domestic civil litigation to enforce international
human rights law raises a number of serious problems for which the
211.  See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916,918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis,
924 F.2d  1086, 1091  (D.C. Cir. 1991);  Garcia-Mir  v. Meese,  788 F.2d  1446,  1453  (11th Cir.
1986).
212.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain,  504 U.S. 655, 666-70  (1992);  Gisbert v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448  (5th Cir. 1993);  Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446,
1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986).  But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson,  505 F. Supp. 787, 795, 798 (D. Kan.
1980).
213.  See, e.g.,  Lea  Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International  Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 295;  Henkin, International  Law as Law, supra note
148.
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sible.  Those who argue for an open-ended incorporation of interna-
tional  human  rights  law  into  domestic  civil  litigation  tend  to
overlook  or  discount  these  problems.  In  this  Part, we  consider
these  problems  in two  contexts:  the  application  of  international
human rights law against domestic  officials  and human rights law-
suits against foreign governmental officials.  We conclude by noting
several  ways  in  which  the Pinochet decision provides  support for
the United States' general resistance to incorporating  international
human rights norms into its domestic civil litigation system.
A.  Domestic Officials
The federal political branches have taken significant steps to en-
sure that international human rights law cannot be applied in civil
litigation against U.S. officials.  The RUDs attached to the U.S. rati-
fication  of human rights treaties render the treaties unenforceable
as  domestic  law.214  On  the  rare  occasion  when  the  political
branches  authorize  the  application  of international  human  rights
norms in civil litigation, they do so only with respect to foreign offi-
cials, not domestic officials.215  The political branches  have applied
international human rights norms to domestic officials for genocide
and war crimes, but these prohibitions can be enforced only by the
Executive.216  Finally, although  the modern  position contemplates
that CIL should be enforceable as federal law against domestic offi-
cials, even those courts that embrace the modern position do not in
fact apply CIL to domestic officials, state or federal.217
The federal  government's  disinclination  to  apply international
human  rights  law  to  domestic  officials  has  been  severely  criti-
cized.218  One  problem  with  these  criticisms  is  that they  tend  to
214.  See supra  text accompanying note 194.  Even a recent executive order by the Clinton
Administration that purports to implement human rights treaties within the federal executive
branch makes clear that "[n]othing in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen-
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person" and that "[t]his order does not super-
sede  Federal  statutes  and  does  not  impose  any  justiciable  obligations  on  the  executive
branch."  Implementation  of Human Rights Treaties,  Exec. Order No. 13107,  63 Fed. Reg.
68,991, 68,993  (1998).
215.  See supra text accompanying notes  134-42.
216.  See  Genocide  Convention  Implementation  Act,  18  U.S.C.  § 1091  (1988);  War
Crimes Act of 1996,  18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (Supp. 1999).
217.  See supra notes 211-13  and accompanying  text.
218.  See, e.g., Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical  Ap-
proach, 3  Buir.  J. INTL.  L. 261  (1997);  Henkin,  Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note 194;
Kenneth Roth, Side-Lined on Human Rights: American Bows Ou4 FoREiGN  A'.,  March/
April 1998,  at 2.
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overlook  the  extraordinary  human  rights  protections  the  United
States  offers  through  its  domestic  constitutional  and  democratic
processes.  The  Bill  of Rights,  the  Reconstruction  Amendments,
and federal and state criminal and civil rights laws broadly prohibit
governmental misconduct.  It is true, of course, that these domestic
legal protections  are not  always perfectly  enforced.  For example,
many of the U.S. police and prison practices that Amnesty Interna-
tional  recently  described  as  violating  international  law 219  are
equally violative of domestic law.  The problem in these contexts is
not an absence  of law, but rather insufficient  enforcement  of and
compliance  with domestic law.  This serious and complicated prob-
lem is to some extent inevitable in all legal systems.  Incorporating
international human rights law into domestic law, however, would
not redress this problem.
We do not mean to suggest that international human rights law
and domestic human  rights protections  are  coextensive.  In some
instances international human rights law probably recognizes differ-
ent and more protective rights than those available under U.S. do-
mestic law.  When these differences are examined closely, however,
the United States' failure to incorporate international human rights
norms appears  less problematic than  critics  suggest.
The  U.S.  Constitution,  including  the Bill  of  Rights,  requires
some of the differences.  Thus, for example, the International  Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)220 prohibits  racial hate
speech,221  and the Convention  on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial  Discrimination222  prohibits  racist propaganda  and  requires
elimination  of racist  organizations.22 3  Because  such  speech  and
organizations  in  many  instances  are  protected  by  the  First
Amendment, the United States entered reservations refusing to ac-
219.  See AmNEsTY  INTERNATIONAL,  RIGHTS  FOR ALL  17-86 (1998).
220.  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  adopted Dec.  19,  1966,  S.
ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2  (1978),  999 U.N.T.S.  171  [hereinafter  ICCPR].
221.  See id. art. 20(2),  S.  ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 29, 999 U.N.T.S.  at 178  (prohibiting
"[a]ny advocacy  of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi-
nation, hostility or violence").
222.  International  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature  Mar. 7, 1966,  S. Exnc. Doc. C, 95-2  (1978),  660 U.N.T.S.  195.
223.  See id. art. 4(a), S. ExEc. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations
to punish by law "all  dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority  or hatred"); id. art.
4(b), S. Exac. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations to "declare  illegal
and prohibit,"  and to punish participation in, organizations  that "promote  and  incite racial
discrimination"); id. art. 7, S. ExEc. Doc. C, 95-2, at 5,660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (requiring nations
to "adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education,
culture  and  information,  with  a  view  to  combating  prejudices  which  lead  to  racial
discrimination").
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any  political  branch consent to these  norms  would be unenforce-
able as domestic law.225
Many  of the other  supposed  differences  between  the require-
ments of international human rights law and U.S. domestic law are
based  on tendentious  constructions  of the relevant  human  rights
norms,  constructions  made  possible  by  the  vague  way  in  which
these norms are identified  and crafted.  This vagueness is in turn a
principal reason why the United States does not authorize courts to
apply this law against domestic  officials.
International human rights law is vague  along two dimensions.
The first type of vagueness concerns the criteria for identifying the
appropriate  sources  of  CIL.  Traditionally,  a  nation  was  bound
under CIL only to the international  obligations to which it had im-
plicitly given its consent through customary practice.226  As under-
stood  by  human  rights  advocates  and  some  courts,  modern
international human rights law  significantly weakens, if not elimi-
nates,  these  consent  and  customary  practice  requirements  for
CIL.2 27  "Customary"  international human rights law does not de-
pend on actual consent or actual practice, but rather depends on an
"international  consensus"  constituted  by  an  uncertain  brew  of
treaty norms (ratified or not), General Assembly resolutions, inter-
national  commissions,  and  academic  commentators.228  Thus,  for
example, some of the Law Lords in the Pinochet  decision thought
224.  See U.S.  Senate Resolution  of Advice and Consent to  Ratification  of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,  140 CONG. REc.
14,326  (1994); U.S. Senate  Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CONG. REc. 8070-71 (1992).  The Genocide
Convention  too  contains  a  reservation stating  that the United States does not  accept any
obligation prohibited by its Constitution.  See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent
to  Ratification  of the International  Convention  on the Prevention  and Punishment of the
Crime  of Genocide, 132  CONG. REc. 2349  (1986).
225.  See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988)  ("[i]t is well-established  that 'no agree-
ment with a  foreign nation  can confer power on the  Congress,  or on any other branch  of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."'  (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16  (1957))).
226.  See MARK  W.  JANis,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  42-43  (3d  ed.
1999); see also, e.g., The Paquete Habana,  175 U.S. 677,  700  (1900)  (noting that the law of
nations is derived in part from "the customs and usages of civilized nations"); The Antelope,
23 U.S. 66, 120-22 (1825)  (observing that the law of nations is derived from "the usages, the
national acts, and the general assent" of the nations of the world).
227.  See HENIN, PoLmcs AND  VALUES,  supra note 192, at 37-38; Blum  & Steinhardt,
supra  note 7, at 64-75;  Louis B. Sohn, The New International  Law:  Protection  of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rv. 1, 9-10  (1982).
228.  See HIF  ,in,  POLmcs AND  VALUES,  supra  note 192, at 38; JANis, supra  note 226, at
103-04; Randall, Federal  Questions, supra note 6, at 388-93; Steinhardt, supra note 145, at 79-
81; see also, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,  881-85  (2d Cir.  1980).
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that, based on General Assembly pronouncements and the writings
of scholars,  CIL prohibited torture long  before ratification  of the
Torture  Convention.229  Similarly, many  commentators  claim  that
the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders  for capital crimes
violates international  law,  even  though this  U.S. practice  is  long-
standing, and the United States has expressly declined to consent to
treaties outlawing  the practice.230
A second type of vagueness  exacerbates  the uncertainty  prob-
lem:  even  when  the source of international  human  rights  law  is
clear,  as  is the  case with  application  of duly ratified  treaties,  the
content of the  norms  embodied  in  the  law  is  often  exceedingly
vague.  Of course, the language of pertinent U.S. constitutional  and
other protections  is sometimes  similarly  vague.  These  vague  do-
mestic provisions,  however, have been given more precise content
through hundreds  and  sometimes  thousands  of judicial  decisions.
This large body of interpretive  case law certainly  does not render
the domestic  provisions  determinant  in  all  contexts.  But it does
provide  a broad core  of settled meaning at any particular point in
time that sharply contrasts with analogous international provisions.
Consider the Fourth Amendment's  prohibition on "unreasona-
ble searches and seizures,"231 which is perhaps  a paradigmatic  ex-
ample  of  an  open-ended  and  indeterminate  constitutional
provision.  Its requirements have changed over time, and when ap-
plied in novel  contexts  it might well provide little  if any real  gui-
dance.  Nonetheless,  the Fourth Amendment  has been interpreted
in thousands of different cases, and these precedents provide police
officials  at  any  particular  time  with  significant  guidance.232  The
same cannot be said, for example, of the ICCPR's analogous prohi-
bition  on  "arbitrary  arrest  or  detention."  233  The  Fourth
Amendment and the ICCPR provision are similarly vague as  writ-
229.  See,  e.g.,  Second  Law Lords'  Decision, [1999]  2  W.L.R.  827,  903  (H.L.)  (Lord
Saville),  912 (Lord Millett).
230.  See, e.g., Joan  F. Hartman,  "Unusual" Punishment:  The Domestic Effects of Inter-
national  Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52  U.  CrN.  L. REv.  655
(1983);  Julian  S.  Nicholls,  Too Young  to Die:  International  Law and the Imposition of the
Juvenile Death Penalty  in the United  States, 5 EMORY  INm.  L. REV.  617 (1991); David WVeissb-
rodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by  the  United States  Violates International Human
Rights Law, 3 AM.  U. J. INTL.  L. & POLY.  339 (1988).
231.  U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
232.  For  an overview  of what is generally settled in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and what  is not, see  Twenty-Seventh Annual Review  of Criminal Procedure, 86  GEo. L.J.
1153,  1187-1352 (1998).
233.  See ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(1), S.  ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at
175.
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practice  because  of the judicial precedents interpreting it.
The vague  content of international  human fights  norms places
the United  States in a difficult position.  The aims of international
human fights law are often desirable, and it is hard to disagree with
the content of much  of this law considered in the abstract.  If this
law were incorporated into the U.S. legal system, however, it could
have  profound  and  unforeseen  effects  on  U.S.  domestic  law.
Although the provisions in human fights treaties often appear to be
similar  to the protections  available  under U.S. domestic law, they
are couched in different terms and it is therefore impossible to pre-
dict how these new sources of law would be interpreted and applied
by U.S. judges.
This  uncertainty  is  illustrated  by  examples  from the  ICCPR,
perhaps  the  most  important  of  all  human  fights  treaties.  How
would  the  ICCPR's  prohibition  on  "arbitrary  arrest  and  deten-
tion"234  affect  the  constitutional  practice  of  checkpoint  sobriety
stops?235  How would its requirement that an arrestee "be brought
promptly before a judge"236 affect the generally constitutional prac-
tice  of  conducting  arraignments  within  48  hours  of  arrest?237
Would its requirement that every "human being" have an "inherent
fight to life" that "shall be protected by law"2 38  strengthen, weaken,
or have  no effect on otherwise-legal parental notification  require-
ments for juvenile abortions? 39  Would the ICCPR's guarantee  of
an  "enforceable  right  to  compensation"  for  "[a]nyone who  has
been the victim of unlawful  arrest or detention"24  override other-
wise-legitimate qualified immunity defenses?241  How would the re-
quirement  that  "[aill  persons  deprived  of  their  liberty  shall  be
treated with humanity  and with respect for the inherent  dignity of
234.  See id.
235.  See Michigan  Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.  444, 455  (1990)  (holding  that
sobriety checkpoints  are legal  under the Fourth Amendment).
236.  ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(3), S. Exac. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
237.  See County of Riverside  v.  McLaughlin,  500 U.S.  44,  58-59  (1991)  (holding that
Fourth Amendment's "promptness"  requirement generally is satisfied by arraignment within
48 hours).
238.  ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 6(1), S. Exac. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
239.  See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292,297-99  (1997)  (upholding constitutionality of
certain parental notification  requirements).
240.  ICCPR, supra note 220,  art. 9(5),  S. ExEc. Doc. E,  95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S.  176
(emphasis  added).
241.  See Malley v. Briggs,  475 U.S. 335,  345-56  (1986)  (recognizing  qualified  immunity
defense for unlawful arrests).
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the human person"242 affect controversial  but constitutional prison
practices?243  There  are scores of similar uncertainties, under both
the ICCPR and other human rights treaties.
The vagueness  of international human rights law is even more
severe in the context of CIL.  In that context, there is no text, and
no  settled  list  of sources,  to  guide  interpretation.  Moreover,  as
noted above,  the objective  "state practice"  component  of CIL has
been relaxed in the human  rights context.244  The open-ended  na-
ture  of the  CIL of human  rights  is illustrated  by the  rapidly  ex-
panding  claims  regarding  its  content.  As  late  as  1986,  the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law  of the  United
States limited  the list of CIL human  rights norms  to prohibitions
against  extremely  egregious  conduct  such  as  torture  and  geno-
cide.245  Since that time,  commentators  have argued  that  CIL in-
cludes  a wide range of additional rights, including rights relating to
the death penalty,  gender violence,  and  the environment.246  And
the list  keeps  growing.  As Ted  Meron  has  observed,  "given  the
rapid continued development of international human rights, the list
as  now  constituted  should  be  regarded  as  essentially  open-
ended.  . . . Many  other  rights  will  be  added  in  the  course  of
time."247
The difficulties associated with ascertaining the content of vague
human  rights  norms  are heightened  by  the fact that  the body  of
interpretive materials that will eventually provide this content will
not necessarily be based  on considerations  of U.S. law and policy.
The United States  has no privileged  say  regarding how the vague
norms of international human rights law will come to be viewed in
practice.  Such meaning will be determined by the decentralized de-
cisions  of a  variety of national  courts, human rights  commissions,
other  international  law  bodies,  and  the  writings  of  scholars.
Although these decisions may in some instances  comport with the
views  of U.S. policymakers, there is no guarantee  that this will be
the case.
242.  ICCPR, supra  note 220, art. 10(1), S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
243.  See Patrick  J.A. McClain  et al., Prisoners' Rights:  Substantive Rights Retained by
Prisoners,  86  GEo. L.J. 1953,  1953-88 (1998).
244. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
245. See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD), supra note 5, § 702.
246.  See, e.g.,  BmrH STEPHENS  & MICHAEL  RATNER,  INTERNATIONAL  HUMAN  RIoHTS
LrrIGATION  IN U.S. COURTS  86-94  (1996).
247.  THEODOR  MERON, HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  HuMANITARIAN  NORMS  AS  CUSTOMARY
LAW  99  (1989).
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This  profound  uncertainty  regarding  the  actual  content  of
human rights norms gives the United States a legitimate reason not
to incorporate  international human  rights  law into  domestic  law.
International law does not require any particular manner of domes-
tic implementation  of its obligations,  and many nations, including
Great Britain, view  all treaties  as  non-self-executing.  The United
States has taken the position that its obligations under the human
rights treaties are fully met by its domestic legal protections, includ-
ing, sometimes, domestic legislation implementing particular inter-
national  obligations.  This  is  a  perfectly  legitimate  method  of
respecting international obligations.  It is hard to know for sure, of
course, whether  U.S. domestic legal protections  fully meet the re-
quirements  of  the vague treaty  requirements.  This is one  reason
why the United States,  in addition to declaring  the human rights
treaties to be non-self-executing, attaches understandings  that clar-
ify its  obligations  and  narrowly  defined  reservations  that  exclude
obligations it cannot meet.
This practice is especially understandable  given that the United
States provides extraordinary - though of course far from perfect
- human rights protections through its domestic constitutional and
political processes.  The United States agrees with many of the obli-
gations in the  treaties,  at least in the abstract terms  in which  the
obligations are couched; thus it assents to many of these obligations
in its ratifications.  Because these  obligations  are  so  uncertain  in
practice,  however,  the  United  States  makes  clear  that it  under-
stands the obligations largely to coincide with United States domes-
tic  law  and practice,  which,  at  least  in  comparison,  is  relatively
clear.24 8  This practice does  not, as  so many commentators  claim,
show contempt for international law.  By ensuring that the United
States  does not assume  international  obligations that it is not pre-
pared to comply with, it arguably shows just the opposite.
248.  For examples of such statements in connection with U.S. ratification of human rights
treaties,  see U.S. Senate Resolution  of Advice and Consent to Ratification  of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,  140 CONG,.  REc.
14,326  (1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification  of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil  and Political Rights,  138  CONG. REc.  8070-71  (1992);  U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice  and Consent to Ratification  of the Convention  Against Torture  and
Other Cruel,  Inhuman  or Degrading Treatment  or Punishment,  136  CONG.  REC.  36198-99
(1990);  U.S. Senate  Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the  International
Convention  on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime  of Genocide, 132 CONG. REc.
2349-50 (1986).
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B.  Foreign Officials
The political branches and the courts have been somewhat more
receptive to applying international human rights law against foreign
officials.  Even in this context, however, the application  of interna-
tional human  rights  law has  been quite  limited.  Filartiga  and  its
progeny  have allowed international  human rights lawsuits  against
foreign officials to proceed under the ATS.  As noted above, how-
ever, the Supreme  Court has made it clear that such ATS suits are
limited by foreign  sovereign  immunity.249  In  addition, in the few
instances  in which  the political  branches  have expressly  provided
for the application of international human rights law against foreign
officials  - for example, in the Torture Victim Protection Act and
the recent terrorism  amendments to the FSIA - they sharply lim-
ited the types of actions that can be brought, and they also imposed
significant procedural  limitations on these actions.250
At first glance,  these  limitations seem  surprising.  The  United
States has long been a champion of human rights, and it frequently
exercises  moral,  economic,  and  military  pressure  against  govern-
ments perceived as violating those rights.  Why, in this light, would
the United States  resist broad  application  of international  human
rights law against foreign officials in U.S. courts?
Part of the answer has  to do with fairness  concerns implicated
by  the  substantive  and  procedural  vagueness  of  international
human rights law.  The norms applied under the Filartiga  rubric are
generated  by the unstructured  and open-ended  CIL-identification
process  discussed  above.  Moreover,  the  Filartiga approach  pro-
vides no guidance on important procedural issues like  statutes  of
limitation, retroactivity,  and  exhaustion.  The  uncertainties  in the
Filartiga  process become clear when one compares it to a rare polit-
ical branch incorporation  of international human rights law - the
TVPA.  The TVPA defined the new federal causes of action for tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing with a careful precision that contrasts
with the vague contours of analogous  CIL and Torture Convention
prohibitions.2 1  It  provided  a  statute  of  limitations  designed  to
249.  See supra text  accompanying note 95.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
251.  The TVPA's  definitions of torture  and extrajudicial  killing are narrower  than those
definitions  under CIL  and the  Torture Convention.  They track  the definitions adopted  by
the Senate's understanding of the requirements  of the Torture Convention, which was a con-
dition  to  the Senate's consent  to  ratification of the treaty.  See S.  RaP.  No.  102-249, at 6
(1991).
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designed to avoid unnecessary interference with foreign nations and
undue burden  on U.S. courts.25 3
This latter consideration points to an even more serious concern
regarding the  foreign  relations  implications  that inhere  in  a civil
human rights suit brought  against  a foreign  governmental  official.
Such a lawsuit obviously can affect the relations between the nation
permitting the lawsuit and the nation whose officials  are subject to
the lawsuit.  This foreign relations  concern has led most nations of
the world to permit their courts to apply human rights law against
foreign government  officials only in criminal  suits under the control
of the executive branch. Both the British and Spanish torture stat-
utes at issue in the Pinochet  litigation contain this limitation.
The United States appears to be unique in opening its courts to
civil suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign governmental  officials
for  human rights  violations  that occurred  on  foreign  soil.-54  The
revival of the long-dormant ATS in a context far removed from its
original purposes may not have happened by accident,255 but it did
not come  about through  a  democratic  process.  Although private
suits under the ATS have  sometimes met with the approval of the
executive  branch when  the private  plaintiffs'  interests  have  coin-
cided with U.S. foreign policy aims,256 no mechanism in ATS litiga-
tion  ensures  this  overlap?57  Instead,  private  litigants  make  the
decisions regarding when to bring these lawsuits, which countries to
252.  See Torture  Victim  Protection  Act, Pub.  L. No.  102-256,  § 2(c),  106  Stat. 73,  73
(1992) (set forth in statutory note following Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.  § 1350 (1994)); see
also H.R. REP.  No. 102-367, at 5 (1991),  reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.  84,  88  (statute of
limitations requirement "insures that the Federal Courts will not have to hear stale claims").
253.  See § 2(b),  106 Stat. at 73; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (exhaustion require-
ment  "ensures  that U.S. courts  will not intrude  into cases more  appropriately  handled by
courts where  the alleged  torture  or killing occurred"  and avoids  "exposing U.S.  courts  to
unnecessary  burdens").
254.  See supra note 145.
255.  For a discussion  of the role of the Center for Constitutional Rights in the Filartiga
case, see STEP-mNs & RATNER, supra note 246, at 9-10.
256.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,  Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232  (2d  Cir.  1995)  (Nos.  94-9035,  94-9069);  Amicus  Curiae  Brief  by  the  United  States
Departments of Justice and State, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)  (No. 79-
6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).  But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. July 10,1989) (No. 86-2448), excerpted in State
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 2 CUmuLATrVE DIGEST 1981-1988  § 7,
at 1571-72  (brief from Reagan  administration  objecting  to  the use of the ATS for  human
rights  litigation).
257.  In suits against leaders of foreign countries, the Executive  does  have the ability to
stop human rights  litigation by  suggesting head-of-state  immunity, and it has done so in a
number  of instances.  See supra notes  184-87  and accompanying  text.  Most  human rights
lawsuits, however,  do not implicate head-of-state  immunity; in those cases, the Executive is
left with, at most, an amicus  curiae role.
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target,  and  what relief  to  seek.  Neither  these  litigants,  nor  the
judges hearing these cases, possess the expertise and constitutional
authority to weigh the benefits  of the litigation against its political
costs.Z58  Moreover,  this  litigation  is  highly  decentralized  and  ad
hoe, and it is subject to a variety of procedural restraints that do not
apply to the political process.
These features of U.S.  civil litigation help explain why the exec-
utive branch  has  sometimes  opposed  even  very limited  measures
aimed at incorporating international human rights law into such liti-
gation.  Thus,  for  example,  the  Bush  administration  initially  op-
posed the TVPA259 and the Clinton administration initially opposed
the 1996 amendments to the FSIA, 260 both on the ground that even
these limited endorsements of international human rights litigation
would,  on balance,  harm  U.S.  foreign  relations  machinery.  For  a
similar reason, President  Clinton recently  declined  to exercise  his
authority under 1998 Amendments to the FSIA to assist plaintiffs in
recovering  human rights judgments  against  Iran and  Cuba.261  As
258. See generally Jack  I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International  Civil
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW  & POLY.  INTL.  Bus. 461
(1993);  John  Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy:  The  Case of the Helms-
Burton Act, 20 HAsTiNos  INTL. & Corm'.  L.R. 747, 772-75  (1997).
259. See Torture Wrictim Protection  Act of1989. Hearing  on S. 1629 and H.R. 1662 Before
the Subcomm.  on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm.  on the Judiciary,
101st Cong.,  2d Sess.  8  (1990)  (written and  oral  testimony by John  0.  McGinnis, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice and David
P. Stewart,  Assistant Legal  Advisor for Human  Rights and  Refugee Affairs,  U.S.  Depart-
ment of State).  President Bush did eventually sign the TVPA  legislation.  Upon signing it,
however, he expressed concern that "U.S.  courts may become  embroiled in difficult and sen-
sitive  disputes  in  other  countries,  and  possibly  ill-founded  or politically  motivated  suits,
which have nothing to do with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful
recovery"  and that "[s]uch  potential  abuse of this statute undoubtedly  would  give rise  to
serious frictions in international relations and would also be a waste of our own limited  and
already  overburdened judicial resources."  Statement on Signing  the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act of 1991,  Mar. 12,  1992, 28 WEEKLY  COMP.  PREs.  Doc. 465,  466 (Mar. 16,  1992).
260.  See  The  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:  Hearings Before  the Subcomm.  on
Courts and Admin. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,  103d  Cong., 2d Sess.  10
(1994)  (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy  Legal Advisor  to U.S. State Department);
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:  Hearings Before the Subcomm.  On Courts and Ad-
min. Practices  of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,  103d Cong., 1st Sess.  (1994)  (statement
of  Stuart  Schifter,  Deputy  Assistant  Attorney  General,  Civil  Division,  Department  of
Justice).
261.  In  1998,  Congress amended  the FSIA to provide  for  attachment and  execution of
otherwise-blocked  assets and  government  assistance  in locating  the assets  in suits  against
state sponsors of terrorism.  See Pub. L. No. 105-277,§  117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 to 2681-
492  (codified  as  amended  at 28  U.S.C.A.  §§ 1610(f)(1)(A),  (1)(B),  (2)(A),  (2)(B)  (Supp.
1999)).  Subsection  (d) of the 1998  amendment  permits the President to waive its require-
ments "in the interest of national security."  See §  117(d) (codified  as amended at statutory
note following 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (Supp. 1999)).  The President invoked subsection (d) in an
attempt to waive application  of the 1998  amendment in its entirety.  See Memorandum  on
Blocked Property of Terrorist-List States, Presidential Determination No. 99-1,  34 WEEKLY
Coae. PREs. Doc. 2088 (Oct. 21, 1998); see also President's Statement on Signing  the Omni-
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these examples illustrate, the incorporation of international human
rights law into the U.S. civil litigation system implicates  significant
foreign relations issues.  These issues, as we argued above, are best
resolved by the political branches  in the first instance.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Pinochet is a  significant  decision  on  many  levels.  Despite  the
Law Lords'  narrowing  of the extradition  charges  against Pinochet,
and the fact that Pinochet might well never stand trial in Spain, the
decision  is a major victory  for the idea that international  law can
regulate domestic human rights abuses.  More broadly, the decision
has  sparked important debates  over the legitimacy  and  efficacy of
unilateral  assertions  of universal  jurisdiction,  the relationship  be-
tween the exercise  of this jurisdiction and  political  solutions (like
amnesties) in the state where the bulk of the human rights abuses
occur, and the virtues and vices of an international criminal court to
try human rights abuses. 262
Pinochet also  is  significant because  it shows  that international
law and the mechanisms  of its  enforcement  are changing.  Recent
developments in international law, especially in the areas of human
rights  and criminal law, have  placed substantial  pressure on tradi-
tional notions of sovereignty, including notions of sovereign immu-
nity.  Concepts  such  as  universal  jurisdiction  have  increased  the
potential  enforceability  of international  law in domestic legal  sys-
tems.  As  a result,  domestic courts  will  increasingly  face  criminal
and  civil  cases  concerning  alleged violations  of international  law.
The United States  already has experienced  this phenomenon,  with
its  growing number  of  civil lawsuits  challenging  abusive practices
around the world.
This increased relevance  of international law to domestic litiga-
tion has the potential to enhance the rule of law in the international
community.  It also means, however, that the enforcement of inter-
national law will increasingly implicate - and sometimes be in ten-
sion with  - domestic  constitutional  standards.  We  have  argued
that, in the  United  States,  the vagueness  of international  human
bus  Consolidated  and  Emergency  Supplemental  Appropriations  Act,  1999,  34  WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2108 (Oct. 23,  1998).  The single court to consider the issue has ruled that
the President's waiver exceeded his authority under the 1998 amendment.  See Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317,1331-32,1339 (S.D. Fla. 1999), rev'd on other  grounds,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS  18841  (11th Cir. Aug.  11,  1999).
262.  For a particularly thoughtful  essay on these issues in light of the House  of Lords'
first Pinochet decision,  see Paul W.  Kahn,  On Pinochet,  24  BOSTON  REvruw,  Feb./March
1999, at 18.
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rights law and the foreign policy implications of human rights litiga-
tion justify restrictions on the incorporation of international human
rights law into the domestic civil litigation system.  In addition, we
have claimed that, for reasons of separation of powers and federal-
ism, federal courts should not play an independent role in incorpo-
rating international human rights law into the U.S. legal system but
should instead  await  authorization  and  direction  from the federal
political branches.  The Pinochet  decision reduces  some of the bar-
riers to the enforcement of international human rights law, at least
in criminal prosecutions  of former heads of state.  The decision also
provides support, however, for the limited and politically controlled
approach to civil human rights litigation that we  have suggested.
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